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Abstract 
Statistical analyses play an important role in employment 
discrimination cases, as the Supreme Court has long recognized. 
Regression analysis can help a plaintiff establish a claim of 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by 
showing that, even when controlling for relevant characteristics, 
individuals of a certain class were treated differently than other 
employees or applicants. It can also help a defendant rebut such a 
claim by showing that differential treatment was due to 
characteristics other than being a member of a protected 
class. Yet, too often, opposing experts present invalid rebuttal 
evidence that the jury or judge overweighs. Opposing experts 
routinely criticize three aspects of the regression: the regression’s 
explanatory variables, its sample size, and its statistical 
significance. Even though these factors affect the reliability of the 
regression results only in very limited circumstances, the judge or 
jury is often persuaded by them and find for the defendant. As a 
result, valid regression analyses do not perform the critical work 
that they should in employment discrimination cases. Our own 
statistical analyses of seventy-eight Title VII employment 
discrimination cases finds that regression analyses do not 
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substantially increase the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing at 
trial and that if the court recognizes any of these common 
critiques, the plaintiff is much less likely to prevail. The severe 
consequences of such critiques make it very important for the court 
and opposing experts to recognize when these critiques are without 
merit. We propose that courts adopt a peer-review system in which 
court-appointed economists, compensated by each party as a 
percentage of the total payment to econometric expert witnesses, 
review econometric evidence before the reports are submitted to the 
judge or jury. 
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I. Introduction 
“Do you have a low-pitched voice? Do you swear often? Have 
you ever done any hunting? Have you participated in wrestling? 
Have you participated in boxing? Have you played football on a 
team?”1 These were questions asked during the hiring process for 
sales representatives at Sears, Roebuck & Co. in the 1980s.2 
While these questions may appear to be on their face 
discriminatory, this evidence was not enough for a class of female 
employees to establish gender discrimination in hiring in 
E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.3 To bolster its case, the plaintiff 
introduced regression analyses that showed that, controlling for 
important factors including job applied for, age, education, job-
type experience, product-line experience, and commission-product 
experience, females were statistically less likely to be hired as 
sales representatives at Sears.4 However, this statistical evidence 
did not improve the plaintiff’s case, as the defendant challenged 
the regression analysis because it did not control for certain 
factors deemed by Sears to be desirable for sales representatives, 
including factors based on the above questions and “physical 
appearance, assertiveness, the ability to communicate, 
friendliness, and economic motivation.”5 Though the court 
                                                                                                     
 1. Ruth Milkman, Women’s History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMINIST STUD. 
375, 382 (1986) (quoting Plaintiff’s Pretrial Brief at 34, E.E.O.C. v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (No. 7964373)).  
 2. See id. (noting these questions were components of an applicant’s vigor 
score, which was used to make hiring decisions). 
 3. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 
1986) (“There is no credible evidence that a woman’s ‘vigor’ score ever prevented 
her from being hired into commission sales at Sears. The court therefore finds 
that Sears’ testing program did not discriminate against women . . . .”). 
 4. See id. at 1296 (discussing a weighted logit regression analysis that 
used these six factors). 
 5. See id. at 1303 (“Other important factors not controlled for in EEOC’s 
analysis are those characteristics which could be determined only from an 
interview, not from the written application. These include physical appearance, 
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acknowledged these qualities were difficult to quantify when 
relying on this argument,6 the court did not require the defendant 
to prove that these qualities varied with gender or to establish 
statistically their importance in hiring. In part because of the 
reliance on this invalid critique, the plaintiffs in this case were 
left without recourse.7  
Parties involved in discrimination cases have presented 
statistical analyses to bolster their cases for decades.8 In fact, the 
Supreme Court recognized the important role of statistical 
analyses in discrimination cases more than thirty-five years ago 
in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.9 
While statistical analyses and, in particular, regression analyses 
still maintain an important role in discrimination cases, that role 
continues to be diminished by rebuttal evidence presented by the 
opposing party.10 Too often, this rebuttal evidence presents 
                                                                                                     
assertiveness, the ability to communicate, friendliness, and economic 
motivation.”). 
 6. See id. at 1303 n.34 (“The court recognizes that these factors are not 
easily quantified for purposes of a statistical analysis, and that data relating to 
these factors was generally not available to EEOC from the application forms it 
chose to rely upon.”).  
 7. See id. at 1353 (“Accordingly, based on the above findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, it is hereby adjudged and ordered that judgment is entered 
against plaintiff and in favor of defendant on all claims at issue in the trial of 
this case, and plaintiff's claim for relief is hereby denied.”). 
 8. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) 
(“Moreover, evidence of a pattern of individual discriminatory acts can, if 
supported by appropriate statistical proof, lend support to a local government's 
determination that broader remedial relief is justified.”); Bazemore v. Friday, 
478 U.S. 385, 387 (1986) (per curiam) (finding that the court of appeals erred by 
disregarding petitioners’ statistical analyses even though the analyses reflected 
salary disparities in place before Title VII applied to the defendant); Furnco 
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (ruling that on remand the 
court must consider statistical evidence showing the employers’ work force was 
racially balanced); United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining that statistical evidence of disparate impact may 
suffice to establish a prima facie case of discrimination).  
 9. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) 
(“In any event, our cases make it unmistakably clear that ‘(s)tatistical analyses 
have served and will continue to serve an important role’ in cases in which the 
existence of discrimination is a disputed issue.” (citation omitted)). 
 10. See City of New York, 637 F. Supp.2d at 85 (explaining ways a 
defendant can rebut statistical evidence presented by the plaintiff to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination). 
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invalid critiques that the jury or judge overweighs. As a result, 
valid regression analyses are often incorrectly negated. 
Proper regression analyses can serve an important role in 
employment discrimination cases. They can help a plaintiff 
establish a claim of discrimination under Title VII by showing 
that, even when controlling for relevant characteristics, 
individuals of a certain class were treated differently than other 
employees or applicants.11 Alternatively, they can help a 
defendant rebut such a claim by showing that differential 
treatment was due to characteristics other than being a member 
of a protected class.12 In addition, despite the Supreme Court’s 
recognition in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes that regression 
analyses may not always be appropriate,13 regression analyses 
can still assist a class of plaintiffs trying to establish 
commonality. Such regression analyses establish that the entire 
class, as members of a protected class under Title VII, 
experienced the same form of discrimination. Unfortunately, due 
to incorrect challenges, often backed by expert witnesses, 
regression analyses do not always serve these important 
purposes.  
All too often, once a party presents regression analyses to 
assist its case, the opposing party launches spurious critiques 
challenging the validity of the analyses.14 Then, without critically 
evaluating those critiques, the judge either accepts the critiques 
                                                                                                     
 11. See, e.g., Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 478 (2d Cir. 
2001) (discussing a regression analysis that showed the plaintiff was paid less 
than male professors even after controlling for relevant factors such as 
experience, tenure status, and type of degree).  
 12. See, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 
1143, 1151 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (explaining how the defendant’s expert argued a 
wage disparity was not based on race because, if the regression analysis 
controlled for all performance evaluations, then race was not a statistically 
significant factor).  
 13. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555–56 (2011) 
(explaining that the regression analyses presented as evidence could not 
establish commonality because a regional disparity does not prove that each 
store within the region has the same disparity).  
 14. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1196 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(providing an example of an expert attacking a statistical analysis because 
variables were missing from the study, even though the expert did not 
demonstrate that the missing variables affected the statistical significance of 
the results).  
2370 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2365 (2014) 
as valid support for a motion or allows the critiques to enter the 
courtroom, where the critiques are overweighed by the jury. This 
often leads to an unbalanced discussion about everything 
potentially wrong with the analyses, instead of a discussion about 
their actual validity. For example, throughout the highly 
publicized litigation of Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,15 the 
plaintiffs’ and defendant’s experts debated whether the presented 
regression analysis established class commonality and provided 
evidence that Wal-Mart discriminated against female employees 
by paying them less.16 As the Northern District of California 
noted in a full 25% of its class-certification motion, the 
defendant’s expert claimed that the plaintiffs’ regression analysis 
was invalid because it failed to separately analyze each division 
of each store and incorrectly analyzed the entire sample of 
employees within a region at once.17 
This unbalanced discussion occurs frequently. All too often 
the opposing experts criticize three aspects of the regression: the 
regression’s explanatory variables, its sample size, and its 
statistical significance, all of which affect the reliability of the 
regression results only in very limited circumstances.18 By 
                                                                                                     
 15. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 16. See id. at 155 (“Plaintiffs present largely uncontested descriptive 
statistics which show that women working in Wal-Mart stores are paid less than 
men in every region, that pay disparities exist in most job categories, that the 
salary gap widens over time even for men and women hired into the same 
jobs . . . .”). 
 17. See id. at 156 (explaining the defendant’s contention that the statistical 
analysis at the regional level fails to account for significant differences in 
compensation practices among the individual stores). These arguments 
eventually led the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that the 
statistical evidence presented by the plaintiffs did not establish a company-wide 
policy of gender discrimination required for commonality and for class 
certification, establishing precedent limiting the use of regression analysis in 
class certification motions. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2555–56. 
 18. See, e.g., Franklin v. Local 2 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assoc., 
565 F.3d 508, 514 (8th Cir. 2009) (providing an example of criticism based on 
variables omitted from the regression that may alter the results); Coleman v. 
Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 593, 618 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (providing an 
example of criticism based on a sample size of forty individuals even though 
eight individuals were members of the relevant protected class); Boyd v. 
Interstate Brands Corps., 256 F.R.D. 340, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (providing an 
example of an expert challenging a plaintiff’s statistical analysis because of 
statistical significance).  
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focusing on these presented econometric criticisms, the judge or 
jury is often persuaded that this evidence is not reliable, and as a 
result, strong and valid evidence of discrimination is disregarded, 
and the defendant prevails.19 This Article analyzes the 
presentation of these critiques in Title VII employment 
discrimination cases and proposes ways for the court to avoid 
allowing an unbalanced discussion of potential econometric 
critiques to negate such valuable evidence. Our own statistical 
analyses of seventy-eight published employment discrimination 
cases finds that regression analyses do not increase substantially 
the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing at trial and that, if the 
court recognizes any of these common critiques, the plaintiff is 
much less likely to prevail. The severe consequences of such 
critiques make it even more important for the court and for 
opposing experts to recognize when these critiques themselves 
are without merit.  
This Article begins by discussing how regression analyses are 
presented in employment discrimination cases and by analyzing 
the court’s recognition of the potential problems with the 
analyses. Part III discusses three of the most common, invalid 
econometric critiques found in employment discrimination cases: 
omitted variables, sample size deficiencies, and lack of statistical 
significance. Part III also establishes the rare circumstances 
when these critiques are actually valid. Part IV then presents a 
statistical analysis of published employment discrimination 
cases, showing the consequences of discounting regression 
analyses through the presentation of invalid or overweighed 
critiques. This analysis shows that when the defendant presents 
critiques of the plaintiff’s regression, the plaintiff is statistically 
significantly less likely to prevail. This Article concludes by 
proposing that courts adopt a peer review system to evaluate the 
validity of critiques proffered by opposing counsel during 
evidentiary deliberations.  
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1344 
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (discussing the court’s finding that important variables were 
omitted) aff’d 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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II. Econometrics in the Courtroom 
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Teamsters, 
regression analysis serves an important role in establishing 
discrimination.20 As a result, parties often introduce regression 
analyses in Title VII employment discrimination cases.21 One 
scholar noted in 1992 that “since [Teamsters], statistical evidence, 
most commonly multiple regression analysis, has become the 
primary means of establishing wage discrimination in disparate 
treatment cases.”22 Generally, the regressions help establish that 
the individuals were less likely to receive a promotion or to be 
hired or that they received lower wages because they were 
members of a protected class.23 Of course, as was acknowledged 
in Bazemore v. Friday,24 regression analyses, when flawed, can 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) 
(noting that statistical analyses play an important role in cases where 
discrimination is a disputed issue).  
 21. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 399 (1986) (per curiam) 
(discussing the petitioners’ heavy reliance on multiple regression analyses to 
demonstrate a pay disparity based on race); Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of 
Am., 380 F.3d 459, 468 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting methodological deficiencies in a 
plaintiff’s regression analyses in a Title VII case); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 
1249, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Multiple regression is a form of statistical analysis 
used increasingly in Title VII actions . . . .”). Plaintiffs also often present such 
evidence in Fair Housing Act claims, in RICO claims, and in constitutional 
challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. Nat’l 
City Bank, 277 F.R.D. 148, 155 (E.D. Pa. 2011), (discussing the use of regression 
analyses in a Fair Housing Act case) aff’d, 726 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2013); 
Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. v. Pfizer, Inc., 712 F.3d 21, 30–31 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (noting that the primary evidence in a RICO case was expert 
testimony describing a regression analysis); Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla. v. 
Metro. Dade Cnty., 122 F.3d 895, 917 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussing the use of 
regression analyses in an Equal Protection Clause case).  
 22. James T. McKeown, Statistics for Wage Discrimination Cases: Why the 
Statistical Models Used Cannot Prove or Disprove Sex Discrimination, 67 IND. 
L.J. 633, 633 (1992). 
 23. See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (giving one example of 
such regression). Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
color, national origin, and religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). In addition, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. 
Finally, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibits wage disparities between men and 
women for equal work. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).  
 24. 478 U.S. 385 (1986). 
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provide inadequate support for such cases.25 This Part provides 
an overview of how regression analyses are used in employment 
discrimination cases and discusses the evidentiary standards 
that federal courts follow when addressing regression analyses as 
evidence. 
A. Econometrics in Employment Discrimination Cases 
Plaintiffs often present expert testimony and reports that 
include regression analyses to support a claim of employment 
discrimination.26 Such employment discrimination claims include 
claims of sex, race, color, or national origin discrimination under 
Title VII, age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA),27 sex discrimination under the Equal 
Pay Act (EPA),28 and disability discrimination under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).29 In these cases, the 
plaintiffs’ expert witnesses present statistics showing that, all 
other qualifications equal, being a member of a protected class 
decreased the plaintiff’s expected wage or likelihood of receiving a 
promotion or being hired.30 Alternatively, defendants often 
present regression analyses to establish that there was not a 
differential in hiring, promotions, or wages between the protected 
class and other similarly situated employees.31 
While regression analyses are common in class action cases, 
such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,32 plaintiffs also often 
                                                                                                     
 25. See id. at 400 n.10 (1986) (“There may, of course, be some regressions 
so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant; but such was clearly not the 
case here.”). 
 26. See cases cited supra note 21 (citing cases in which regression analyses 
were conducted by experts and presented as evidence).  
 27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34. 
 28. Id. § 206(d). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 30. See, e.g., Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 478 (2d Cir. 
2001) (discussing a statistical analysis that showed the plaintiff was paid less 
than male professors even after controlling for relevant factors such as 
experience, tenure status, and type of degree). 
 31. See, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 
1143, 1151 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (explaining the defendant’s expert’s use of statistical 
evidence to rebut the contention that a wage disparity was based on race). 
 32. See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011) (discussing regression analyses the 
2374 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2365 (2014) 
introduce regression analyses in individual employment 
discrimination claims.33 In individual claims, this evidence can be 
used to establish disparate treatment claims, which allege that 
the employer treated the plaintiff worse than similarly situated 
individuals due to his or her protected class, or to establish 
underlying disparate impact claims, which allege that the 
defendant’s policies have a differential impact on members of a 
protected class.34 For example, in Lavin-McEleney v. Marist 
College,35 the plaintiff, Ms. Lavin-McEleney, filed a disparate 
treatment claim, alleging that her employer, Marist College, paid 
her lower wages than her male counterparts.36 To establish such 
a claim, the plaintiff presented expert-witness reports that 
included regression analyses, which analyzed the wages of each 
professor at Marist College.37 These regressions controlled for 
characteristics that could influence each professor’s wage 
separately from his or her sex, and the results showed a 
significant wage disparity on the basis of sex.38 This evidence, 
along with anecdotal evidence, led the jury to find for the plaintiff 
and led the Second Circuit to uphold this decision.39 
Plaintiffs often present regression analyses as evidence in 
class action discrimination cases to support a pattern or practice 
in a disparate treatment discrimination claim and to establish 
                                                                                                     
plaintiffs argued were evidence of commonality).  
 33. See Derrickson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689 (D. 
Md. 2000) (noting the use of a regression analysis as evidence in an individual’s 
claim that he was denied a promotion based on his race). 
 34. Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond 
“Damned Lies,” 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1993) (“Under disparate-impact 
theory, the plaintiff challenges a facially neutral employment practice on the 
ground that it produces an adverse––if only inadvertent––effect on a protected 
group.”). 
 35. 239 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 36. See id. at 478 (discussing the plaintiff’s allegation that her raises were 
discriminatory because she was not promoted to a full professor despite her 
request to have her salary reviewed for gender disparity). 
 37. See id. at 482 (noting that the expert used salaries of the entire faculty 
to attain a sufficiently large sample size). 
 38. See id. at 478 (“[The plaintiff’s expert] found that the plaintiff was paid 
significantly less than comparable male professors within the division.”). 
 39. See id. at 481 (“We hold that statistical evidence of gender based salary 
disparity among comparable professors properly contributed to plaintiff’s case in 
conjunction with her identification of a specific male comparator.”). 
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commonality between the members of the class as required by 
statute.40 Notably, the Supreme Court of the United States 
addressed the requirement of commonality in Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes, a nationwide class action of female employees 
alleging that Wal-Mart discriminated against females in their 
pay and promotion practices.41 In Dukes, the plaintiffs were 
seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief.42 To establish 
commonality and a prima facie case of gender discrimination, the 
plaintiffs presented expert reports using regression analyses to 
show that the plaintiffs, as females, received statistically 
significant lower wages and were less likely to receive promotions 
than their male counterparts.43 Ultimately, the Court thought 
that the region-by-region regressions were insufficient to 
establish that the discrimination was typical of the employer’s 
practices because it could not establish a uniform, store-by-store 
wage and promotion disparity.44  
However, since Dukes, courts have permitted regression 
analyses as support for more limited class claims. In Ellis v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp.,45 the Northern District of California 
distinguished a nationwide class of female employees alleging 
                                                                                                     
 40. Plaintiffs in a class action can also allege disparate treatment claims. 
Browne, supra note 34. 
 41. See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011) (“[T]he Court of Appeals approved the 
certification of a class comprising about one and a half million plaintiffs, current 
and former employees of petitioner Wal-Mart who allege that the discretion 
exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion matters violates 
Title VII by discriminating against women.”).  
 42. See id. (“In addition to injunctive and declaratory relief, the plaintiffs 
seek an award of back pay.”).  
 43. See id. at 2555 (explaining that, after the plaintiffs’ expert conducted a 
regression analysis, he concluded that “there are statistically significant 
disparities between men and women at Wal-Mart . . . [and] these 
disparities . . . can only be explained by gender discrimination” (citation 
omitted)). The Court had to address Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or 
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole.” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23).  
 44. See id. (“A regional pay disparity, for example, may be attributable to 
only a small set of Wal-Mart stores, and cannot by itself establish the uniform, 
store-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs’ theory of commonality 
depends.”).  
 45.  285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  
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gender discrimination against their employer from the class in 
Dukes.46 The court distinguished the class because of its smaller 
size, because it was limited to two positions with uniform job 
descriptions, and because it identified specific practices of the 
employer in one type of promotion.47 As a result, the court did 
look to the regression analyses to establish commonality, and 
because the regression analyses established class-wide (and not 
localized) gender disparities, the court found commonality and 
certified the class.48  
Ellis shows that even after Dukes, regression analyses can 
provide evidence of commonality in class action employment 
discrimination cases as well as establish a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination (either disparate impact or disparate 
treatment claims). However, as was the case in both Ellis and 
Dukes, such analyses are usually heavily scrutinized by the 
opposing party’s conflicting expert testimony.49 Unfortunately, 
despite the presence of evidentiary standards to help guide the 
court, judges and juries are not often equipped to analyze the 
strength of such conflicting testimony. 
B. Economists as Experts 
Generally, regression analyses must be ruled admissible 
under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows an 
expert qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
                                                                                                     
 46. See id. at 509 (“As explained further below, the proposed classes in the 
instant case differ from that examined in Dukes in several material ways.”).  
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 530 (“Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence demonstrates classwide—
as opposed to fragmented or localized—gender disparities supporting its 
contention that Defendant’s classwide practices yield classwide effects.”). 
 49. See id. at 521 (noting that defendant’s expert conducted a statistical 
study and found no evidence of gender disparity); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) (“The parties dispute whether Bielby’s [the 
plaintiffs’ expert] testimony even met the standards for the admission of expert 
testimony under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 702 and our Daubert 
case . . . .”). For a discussion of common critiques of regression analyses in class 
action cases, including sample size issues, see William T. Bielby & Pamela 
Coukos, “Statistical Dueling” with Unconventional Weapons: What Courts 
Should Know About Experts in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 56 
EMORY L.J. 1563 (2007).  
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education” to testify and give opinions if: (1) the testimony will 
assist the trier of fact; (2) it is “based on sufficient facts or data;” 
(3) it is “the product of reliable principles and methods;” and 
(4) “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to 
the facts of the case.”50 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,51 the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Rule 
702 to require the judge to exercise general gatekeeping functions 
and limit scientific and technical expert testimony based on 
whether it “can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been 
subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential 
error rate and the existence of maintenance of standards 
controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread 
acceptance within a relevant scientific community.”52 
Generally, a federal judge must determine whether to grant 
motions to strike expert testimony under Rule 702, and the judge 
must make this decision under Daubert. However, the vague 
language of Rule 702 and of the Daubert standard do not provide 
much guidance for this decision, and the judge must decide 
whether the theory or technique behind the scientific testimony 
meets Daubert’s requirements. Ultimately, this is a large burden, 
and “[a]ssessing these factors can be daunting for experts trained 
in science—judges and their clerks, as scientific laymen, will have 
even more trouble.”53 
The Daubert analysis is very important for the introduction 
of expert reports on regression analyses because of the complex 
nature of the studies and the ability of the studies to be 
manipulated. When experts present regression analyses as 
evidence of employment discrimination in Title VII cases, it is 
very important for the judge to take his or her gatekeeping 
function under Daubert very seriously. It is worthwhile to 
                                                                                                     
 50. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 51. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 52. Id. at 593–94. 
 53. Lawrence S. Pinsky, The Use of Scientific Peer Review and Colloquia to 
Assist Judges in the Admissibility Gatekeeping Mandated by Daubert, 34 HOUS. 
L. REV. 527, 543 (1997); see also Justin P. Murphy, Expert Witnesses at Trial: 
Where Are the Ethics?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 227 (2000) (“The 
determination of reliability can present a significant burden for trial court 
judges. Trial court judges are asked under rule 702 to be ‘better equipped than 
an honestly-testifying expert to know whether the expert’s opinion is reliable. 
That is an unlikely premise.’” (citation omitted)).  
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consider the incentives of parties to litigation to present empirical 
evidence and, especially, the incentive of the plaintiff. Parties are 
not obligated to present statistical evidence of discrimination. 
This is especially true in disparate treatment cases, where 
specific examples of discriminatory treatment are likely to be 
more persuasive than dry statistics.54 
Given the upfront costs involved in hiring an economic expert 
to conduct regression analyses, as well as the ease (as we show 
infra) with which defendants can rebut valid statistical evidence 
by misleading or confusing jurors, plaintiffs should only be 
incentivized to present regression evidence when the statistical 
methodology utilized is consistent with professional standards. 
As a result, the general concerns with expert testimony may be 
diminished in the presentation of regressions presented by the 
plaintiffs, making the Daubert analysis less important. However, 
defendants still have incentives to present invalid attacks, and 
those attacks should also be scrutinized. This Article proposes 
that not only should the judge consider the reliability of the 
regressions presented in favor of the plaintiff, but the judge must 
also consider the reliability of the critiques that the defendant 
presents because the introduction of invalid attacks on regression 
analyses can negate the presentation of reliable evidence that 
suggests discrimination. Unfortunately, courts have adopted the 
defendant’s attacks on the plaintiff’s regression analyses in many 
cases, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged when this 
adoption is problematic.55  
                                                                                                     
 54. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 399 (1977) 
(“[T]his was not a case in which the Government relied on ‘statistics alone.’ The 
individuals who testified about their personal experiences with the company 
brought the cold numbers convincingly to life.”).  
 55. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 401 (1986) (per curiam) (finding 
that “the Court of Appeals failed utterly to examine the regression analyses in 
light of all the evidence in the record”). The Court reasoned that, “[w]hile the 
omission of variables from a regression analysis may render the analysis less 
probative than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other 
infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for the major factors ‘must be 
considered unacceptable as evidence of discrimination.’” Id. at 400 (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, the Court ruled that “[n]ormally, failure to include 
variables will affect the analysis’ probativeness, not its admissibility.” Id.  
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C. The Court’s Recognition of Potential Problems 
Even before Daubert controlled the introduction of expert 
evidence under Rule 702, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the 
methodological concerns of statistics as evidence of employment 
discrimination. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States,56 the United States presented statistical evidence 
to support their claim of race discrimination in pay and 
promotion practices.57 After emphasizing the value of such 
evidence, the Court then cautioned “that statistics are not 
irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind 
of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness 
depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.”58 
Following Teamsters, legal scholars also began to acknowledge 
the potential manipulation and problems associated with 
econometrics in the courtroom, and expert witnesses began to 
present convincing, but often invalid, critiques of the opponent 
expert’s analysis that surrounded the choice of variables 
controlled for in the regression.59 
A highly visible example of valid statistical evidence being 
rebutted following Teamsters occurred in E.E.O.C. v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co.60 At the time, Sears was the second largest private 
employer of women in the United States.61 In Sears, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought a sex 
discrimination suit against Sears and supported that suit with 
regression analyses that showed a disparity between the hiring 
                                                                                                     
 56. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 57. See id. at 399–400 (discussing case law that supports the use of 
statistical evidence to establish discrimination). 
 58. Id. at 340. 
 59. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1048, 1095 (1985) (arguing that the expanded use of multiple regression 
techniques is accompanied by the possibility of their misuse). To avoid misuse, 
Rubinfeld recommended that expert testimony include whether results were 
sensitive to the choice of variables used in the regression model. Id.  
 60. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986).  
 61. See Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom and 
Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1629, 1641 
(1988) (noting that during the period covered by the litigation Sears was the 
second largest employer of women outside of the federal government).  
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and paying of males and females.62 However, the court discounted 
the regression analysis that showed that females were less likely 
to be hired into higher-paying commission sales jobs at Sears 
because of the “omission and inadequate coding of important 
variables.”63 These factors included “the applicant’s interest in 
commission sales and in the product to be sold, . . . physical 
appearance, assertiveness, the ability to communicate, 
friendliness, and economic motivation.”64 Even though the court 
recognized that these factors were difficult to quantify, it noted 
that the absence of the factors meant that the plaintiff expert’s 
analyses were entitled to less weight.65 The court also accorded 
less weight to the regressions analyzing the salaries of the 
employees because the regressions did not control for several 
measurable variables including “veteran status, marital status 
and size of family, leaves of absence and college major” and 
unquantifiable variables, including “loyalty, dedication, and 
motivation.”66 The Northern District of Illinois incorrectly relied 
on the premise that “[i]t is important to include all variables that 
significantly influence the dependent variable.”67  
The notion that it is important to include all variables that 
may affect the dependent variable in a regression analysis 
attempting to prove employment discrimination had become so 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1302–03 (discussing the court’s criticism of 
the EEOC’s statistical evidence).    
 63. See id. at 1302 (concluding the EEOC’s analysis was flawed because of 
its “failure to include in its analysis many important factors that significantly 
affect the hiring process”). 
 64. Id. at 1302–03. The plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Siskin, introduced 
compensation regressions that accounted for the following variables: sex; time in 
present assignment; time in present assignment squared; additional time in 
checklist; additional time in checklist squared; additional time at company; 
additional time at company squared; territory of employee; job performance; 
whether employee was hired as a college trainee; whether the facility was 
located in an urban area; and education. Id. at 1339. It should be noted that a 
regression that takes into account these factors easily meets professional 
standards for publication in peer-reviewed economics journals. Infra Part III.A. 
 65. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1303 n.34 (“The court recognizes that these 
factors are not easily quantified for purposes of a statistical analysis, and that 
data relating to these factors was generally not available to 
EEOC . . . . Therefore, Dr. Siskin's analyses are entitled to less weight to the 
extent they do not incorporate these factors.”).  
 66. Id. at 1344–45. 
 67. Id. at 1287. This incorrect reliance will be explained in Part III.A, infra. 
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prominent in the 1980s that some courts began to recognize its 
misuse. United States Department of Treasury v. Harris Trust 
and Savings Bank68 was an administrative proceeding in which 
the Department of Labor and the Department of Treasury alleged 
that Harris discriminated against women and minorities in 
violation of Executive Order 11246.69 During the proceeding, the 
plaintiff’s expert presented a regression analysis that controlled 
for education, school major, experience, and prior experience, and 
the defendant challenged the regression due to omitted 
variables.70 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) then recognized 
that every regression excludes certain variables that may affect 
an employment decision and injected a very satirical but telling 
story in footnote thirty-six: 
The story is told about how detailed records were kept 
between 1900 and 1982 of the amount of krill estimated to 
have been eaten by all Antarctic mammals. A statistical whiz, 
with unlimited use of free computer time, compared these 
observations with both the gross national product of Lithuania 
in 1985 and the sale of liters of wine in Andorra in 1986. He 
found several direct correlations. He concluded that he could 
show that krill eaten was an absolute predictor for all sorts of 
phenomena if given appropriate access to a free computer. It is 
also told that he received large fees in many court cases by 
testifying about how krill eaten in Antarctic was the missing 
variable in the statistical analysis of one party or another in 
merger and discrimination matters. Luckily, no such 
presentation was made in this case and this “omitted” variable 
was not addressed.71 
Contrary to the court in Sears, the ALJ then stated that, “while 
the weight given the evidence may be reduced as a refinement of 
the variables is made, [the U.S. expert’s] study still contributes to 
the Plaintiff's case.”72 
                                                                                                     
 68. 78-OFC-2, ALJ’s Recommended Decision (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 22, 1986). 
 69. Id. at 4. 
 70. See id. at 24 (noting that Harris attacked the validity of the 
government’s statistical evidence by contending that adjustment bias and 
omitted variables permeated the statistical evidence).  
 71. Id. at 33 n.36. 
 72. Id. at 33.  
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The Supreme Court addressed in Bazemore v. Friday73 the 
legitimacy of regression analyses in employment discrimination 
cases even when such regressions do not include every variable 
the defendant claims is relevant.74 In Bazemore, multiple black 
employees alleged racial discrimination in payment practices.75 
To support this claim, the plaintiffs introduced statistical 
evidence, including regression results that showed a large pay 
disparity between black and white employees with the same job 
title, education, and tenure.76 However, the District Court refused 
to accept the evidence as proof of discrimination, and the Court of 
Appeals upheld that determination.77 The Supreme Court 
addressed the potentially valid reason for such refusal: the 
regressions failed to consider “a number of variable factors” that 
were relevant in salary considerations.78 Although the 
regressions controlled for the variables that were identified by an 
Extension Service official as most determinative of salary 
(education, tenure, and job title) in addition to race, the 
defendants offered nine additional variables that they claimed 
needed to be included for the regression to be valid.79 The 
defendant argued that the plaintiffs’ failure to include these 
                                                                                                     
 73. 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986). 
 74. See id. at 400 (per curiam) (“While the omission of variables from a 
regression analysis may render the analysis less probative than it otherwise 
might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other infirmity, that an analysis 
which accounts for the major factors ‘must be considered unacceptable as 
evidence of discrimination.’”). 
 75. Id. at 394. 
 76. See id. at 398 (discussing the variables used in the regression analysis 
and explaining that the “[p]etitioners selected these variables based on 
discovery testimony by an Extension Service official that four factors were 
determinative of salary: education, tenure, job title, and job performance”). The 
average pay disparity in 1975 was $395 a year, which was a disparity of about 
3% of average annual salary in that year ($12,524). The average pay disparity in 
1974 was $331 a year. Id. at 399. 
 77. See id. at 399 (“The Court of Appeals stated: [t]he district court refused 
to accept plaintiffs’ expert testimony as proof of discrimination . . . because the 
plaintiffs’ expert had not included a number of variable factors the court 
considered relevant . . . . The district court was, of course, correct in this 
analysis.”).  
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 404 n.15 (noting that the district court listed nine variables it 
believed petitioners should have accounted for in their regression).  
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variables resulted in a false showing of discrimination.80 But the 
Supreme Court recognized that, even though omitted variables 
can make regression analyses less probative, this consideration 
should not usually be made at the admissibility stage.81 In fact, 
the Supreme Court noted that, because the burden of proof is 
preponderance of the evidence, regression analyses that do not 
include “all measurable variables” can “serve to prove a plaintiff’s 
case.”82 As a result, the Court remanded the case for the lower 
court to consider the statistical evidence in light of the entire 
record.83 Unfortunately, some courts and opposing experts still 
maintain that if any seemingly plausible variable can be declared 
an “omitted” variable, then the regression analysis is too 
unreliable to “prove a plaintiff’s case.”84 
Following Bazemore, courts should have been less likely to 
discount the proof offered by regression analyses that fail to 
include every measureable variable. Unfortunately, Bazemore did 
not influence all courts in this manner. In fact, after Bazemore, 
the Seventh Circuit addressed the omitted variables in Sears and 
found “that the EEOC’s failure to support its choice of variables 
in this case casts a shadow on the probative value of the 
regression analyses incorporating those variables.”85 The Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged Bazemore but recognized that the district 
court likely considered the regressions to be “so incomplete as to 
be inadmissible as irrelevant,” which is the exception to the 
admissibility standards as recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Bazemore.86 The Seventh Circuit found that the district court’s 
                                                                                                     
 80. See id. at 399–400 (noting that the district court found that the 
regression analysis was not valid evidence of discrimination because experts 
failed to include variables which “ought to be reasonably viewed as 
determinants of salary”).  
 81. See id. at 400 (finding that failure to include variables affects 
probability, not admissibility).  
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 386–87 (holding that the “Court of Appeals erred in 
disregarding petitioners’ statistical analysis . . . [and] that on remand, the Court 
of Appeals should examine all of the evidence in the record . . .”).  
 84. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 349 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(finding that the district court did not err in concluding that the EEOC 
regression analysis was flawed due to omitted variables and incomplete data).  
 85. Id. at 326.  
 86. Id. at 327 (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 n.10 (1986)). 
The Fourth Circuit also addressed how Bazemore applies during a summary 
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criticisms of the regression analysis were not clearly erroneous 
and upheld the decision for the defendant.87 
The lower court decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
provides an example of the court properly acknowledging 
Bazemore, but it also shows that defendants continued to make 
the same arguments following Bazemore. To establish class 
commonality and underlying disparate treatment in wages for 
women, the plaintiffs presented regression analyses that 
controlled for a number of major variables, including: “gender, 
length of time with the company, number of weeks worked during 
the year, whether the employee was hir[ed] or terminated during 
the year, full-time or part-time, which store the employee worked 
in, whether the employee was ever hired into a management 
position, job position, and job review ratings.”88 The defendant’s 
expert (Dr. Haworth, who was also the expert in Sears) claimed, 
“[T]hese variables do not fully reflect [Wal-Mart’s] compensation 
decision-making structure, thereby leaving open the possibility 
that one or more missing variables could explain the gender 
disparities in question.”89 The eleven other variables that Dr. 
Haworth recognized were quite similar to those she recognized in 
Sears: “hours worked, seniority, leave of absence, full-time/part-
time status at hire, recent promotion or demotion, prior grocery 
experience, pay group, night shift, department, store size, and 
store profitability.”90 When the defendant sought to exclude the 
plaintiffs’ regression from trial, the Northern District of 
                                                                                                     
judgment motion and agreed that, due to the omission of variables measuring 
performance, the probative value of the regression analysis was an issue of 
material fact for the jury to decide in Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth 
University. See 84 F.3d 672, 676–77 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a question of 
material fact existed as to whether actual performance factors should have been 
included in the university’s analysis). In this case, the defendant, VCU, 
presented a regression analysis to support its adoption of an affirmative action 
program for women, and the district court relied on this regression to find for 
VCU on summary judgment; however, due to the alleged flaws of the regression, 
the Fourth Circuit overturned the motion. Id. at 677.  
 87. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d at 348 (noting that “the district 
court’s finding that the EEOC had not proved sex discrimination in wages 
through its flawed multiple regression analyses is not clearly erroneous”).  
 88. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 159 (N.D. Cal 2004). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.; see E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 330 (7th Cir. 
1988) (discussing Haworth’s regression analysis in Sears).  
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California quoted Bazemore, denied the motion, and determined 
that the regression went “well above the minimal threshold 
established by the courts, and thus his analysis is sufficient to 
raise an inference of discrimination for purposes of this motion.”91 
Ultimately, the defendant continued to make this argument 
throughout the trial, and the argument influenced the Supreme 
Court when the Court rejected the regression analyses as proof of 
commonality or of disparate treatment.92 
Many courts acknowledge Bazemore and the fact that 
econometric critiques challenging regression analyses should only 
affect the admissibility of regression analyses as evidence of 
employment discrimination in situations in which the regression 
analyses are “so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant.”93 
However, defendants continue to make these arguments in court, 
and even though some courts correctly apply the admissibility 
standard, these arguments are also admitted, such that invalid 
critiques continue to diminish or eliminate the probativeness of 
the plaintiff’s regression results. The three critiques that we 
found to be the most commonly argued in court are presented in 
the following section. The consequences of admitting the critiques 
when they are invalid are illustrated in the following empirical 
study. Recent examples of these consequences and of the court 
avoiding such consequences are presented in Part V.  
III. Three Econometric Critiques  
A review of employment discrimination judicial opinions and 
expert witness reports illustrates that opposing experts routinely 
offer the same three critiques to rebut a plaintiff’s regression 
                                                                                                     
 91. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 160.  
 92. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555–56 (2011) 
(finding that respondents’ statistical proof and regression analyses failed to 
provide evidence of commonality either regionally, or, if the proof did exist, 
nationally).  
 93. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d at 326, 327 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that the district court did not find the EEOC’s analysis inadmissible due to 
failure to include variables, but instead found the analyses were not probative 
such that they were “so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant,” 
qualifying as the exception to the rule in Bazemore) (quoting Bazemore v. 
Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 n.10 (1986)). 
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analysis. These three critiques are omitted variables, adequacy of 
sample, and lack of statistical significance.94 To determine the 
prominence of these three issues and to analyze how courts treat 
each issue, we searched for all Title VII employment 
discrimination cases filed in the federal courts since 2000 that 
mention “regression analysis.” This search resulted in a sample of 
seventy-eight cases.95 This Part discusses these three prominent 
econometric issues as they pertain to Title VII employment 
discrimination cases and identifies when and why these critiques 
are overwhelmingly invalid. 
A. Omitted Variables 
In over 63% of the cases gathered, the court recognized that 
the opposing expert notes that the regression did not control for 
all measurable variables that may affect the treatment of the 
employees.96 More specifically, courts frequently note (as the 
result of opposing expert testimony) that the plaintiff’s regression 
analyses do not control for certain variables that the defendant 
argues are important determinants of employment decisions. 
This was the issue at hand in Bazemore.97 Legal scholars have 
                                                                                                     
 94. See generally Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (addressing 
omitted variables); Thomas v. Deloitte Consulting LP, No. 3-02-CV-0343-M, 
2004 WL 1960097 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2004) (addressing issues relating to 
statistical significance); Coleman v. Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 593 
(S.D. Tex. 2001) (noting problems with the sample size).  
 95. The citations to each case are listed in Table A of the Appendix. This 
sample is the result of a Westlaw search and, as such, does not represent all 
federal employment discrimination cases in which plaintiffs presented 
regression analyses. However, the statistics gathered from the search still 
provide insight into the prominence of such issues and anecdotal evidence 
gathered from the opinions provides insight into how courts address such issues. 
While the original search that resulted in the sample was for “regression 
analysis,” a search for cases published between “regression analys!” results in 
the same sample. We did not expand the search to include “regression” because 
the courts almost always use “analysis[es]” and often use “regression” for its 
noneconometric meaning. The original search resulted in 177 cases; however, 
many of these cases were duplicates, many of the cases simply referenced other 
cases that presented regression analyses, and many of the cases simply 
referenced a Title VII case in the opinion.  
 96. See infra Table 2.  
 97. See 478 U.S. 385, 400–01 (1986) (noting the differences between 
plaintiffs’ variables and defendants’ variables).  
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recognized since 1986 that defendants attack plaintiff’s 
regressions for “fail[ing] to account for important explanatory 
factors.”98 That all potential variables are not included is a 
characteristic of regression analysis and does not reflect 
shortcomings of the analysis. In fact, many personal 
characteristics, such as marital status and number of children 
that would be included in academic studies of earnings, are 
specifically excluded from earnings regressions in litigation 
because these personal characteristics are not legally relevant. 
Other reasons for excluding variables include that the variable at 
question may itself be a product of the discriminatory treatment 
at issue.99  
The random error term, which is part of any regression 
equation, encompasses the effects of variables not directly 
included in the regression equation. Including more variables 
may result in higher explanatory power of the regression 
equation (what economists refer to as the R squared), but the 
                                                                                                     
 98. Barbara A. Norris, Multiple Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: A 
Structural Approach to Attacks of “Missing Factors” and “Pre-Act 
Discrimination,” 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63 (1986).  
 99. See Trout v. Garrett, 780 F. Supp. 1396, 1412–13 (D.D.C. 1991) 
Regression analyses are typically challenged on the basis that one or 
more variables should be included or excluded because of their 
appropriateness or lack thereof. One basis for excluding a variable as 
“tainted” is that it gives a false explanation for the disparate impact. 
A prime example of tainted variables are “status variables,” such as 
job rank or grade level, which could reflect, at least in part, prior 
discrimination. Baldus & Cole, Statistical Proof of Discrimination 
§ 83 at 112–13 (1987 Supp.). If, for example, an individual’s grade 
level is itself based on discrimination, then use of grade level as a 
variable would falsely suggest that disparities in pay were 
attributable to an objective factor rather than to the real source, 
discrimination. In this Circuit, it is the law that a variable is to be 
excluded if it is not demonstrated by clear, affirmative evidence that 
it is based on neutral, objective factors, applied consistently. 
Valentino v. United States Postal Service, 674 F.2d 56, 72 n.30 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982); cf. Sobel v. Yeshiva University, 839 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1988). 
One scholar has argued that tainted variables can still assist a court in 
determining what type of decisions lead to disparities and in determining the 
appropriate level of damages. See Srijati Ananda & Kevin Gilmartin, Inclusion 
of Potentially Tainted Variables in Regression Analyses for Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 121, 151 (1991) (noting that tainted 
variables can be helpful to achieve more accurate assessments of discrimination, 
which can have “obvious relevance in the shaping of appropriate injunctive and 
monetary relief”).  
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only valid concern is whether failure to control for the alleged 
omitted variable causes “omitted variable bias.” The practical 
consequence of omitted variable bias in employment 
discrimination cases is that the estimated regression equation 
erroneously shows discrimination when in fact the omitted factor 
is the legitimate and nondiscriminatory cause of the differential 
employment outcome between the protected class and the 
nonprotected class.100 In addition to not being a “tainted 
variable,” two conditions must hold for the omitted variables to 
cause the estimate of the coefficient of interest to be biased: the 
omitted variable must be correlated with the variable that 
represents the protected class at issue and the omitted variable 
must have a statistically significant effect on the outcome.101 
Often, the purported omitted variable will not have a statistically 
significant effect on the outcome.102 The lack of an effect occurs 
because it is not important or because it is correlated with 
variables already included in the equation so that further 
inclusion of a related variable is redundant and adds little to the 
regression.103 
For example, in Bazemore, if the primary omitted variable 
raised by the defendant (job performance) was correlated with the 
variable of interest (a variable indicating that the observation 
was a black individual), if performance rating had a statistically 
significant positive effect on pay, and if performance ratings were 
not themselves discriminatorily assigned, then omitted variable 
bias would result. If the omitted variable was negatively 
correlated with race (meaning black individuals have worse job 
performance), then its omission would bias the coefficient on the 
variable of interest upwards because job performance is positively 
correlated with wage; this bias would have meant that the 
significant positive coefficient on the variable of interest (black) 
may have been overstated. This bias would show a larger pay 
disparity due to race than would appear in a regression analysis 
                                                                                                     
 100. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 90–91 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining omitted variable biases).  
 101. See id. at 91 (discussing the effect of the omitted variable bias on 
regression analyses). 
 102. See id. (noting that a small bias “need not be a cause for concern”).  
 103. See id. at 91–92 (discussing the effect of sample size and variable 
correlation on a regression analysis).  
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that also controlled for job performance. Alternatively, if black 
individuals had better job performance, omission of job 
performance would show a lower disparity in pay on the basis of 
race.  
In fact, in Bazemore, regressions that included job 
performance showed a larger race disparity than regressions that 
excluded this variable.104 The remaining additional variables 
offered by the defendants to explain the observed pay disparity 
referred to county-to-county differences in salary increases.105 
However, unrebutted evidence showed that blacks were not 
disproportionately located in counties that contributed only a 
small amount to salary increases.106 That is, the so-called omitted 
variables were not correlated with the variable of interest. Absent 
a correlation between the so-called omitted factors and the 
protected class, these omitted factors could not provide a race-
neutral explanation for the pay disparity.107 The above discussion 
is summarized in Takeaway One below. 
Takeaway One: An omitted variable that will only affect the 
results of a regression analysis establishes discrimination if 
the omitted variable is correlated with the variable of interest 
(likely an indicator variable for the individual being a member 
of the protected class) and is itself a statistically significant 
determinant of the outcome. Furthermore, many possible 
variables are legitimately excluded because they are not 
legally relevant, because they may themselves be the outcome 
of the discriminatory treatment at issue, or because they are 
adequately represented by variables already included in the 
regression equation. 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 401 (1986). The pay disparity 
was $475 as compared to the values discussed. Id. The regressions were not 
presented at trial because performance ratings were missing from 20% of the 
employment records. See id. at 401 n.11 (noting missing data).  
 105. Id. at 404 n.15 (noting missing variables related to county-to-county 
differences). 
 106. See id. at 402 (“The United States presented evidence which it claims 
respondents did not rebut, establishing that black employees were not located 
disproportionately in the counties that contributed only a small amount to 
Extension Service salaries.”).  
 107. See id. (“Absent a disproportionate concentration of blacks in such 
counties, it is difficult, if not impossible to understand how the fact that some 
counties contribute less to salaries than others could explain disparities 
between black and white salaries.”).  
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B. Sample Size 
In over 62% of the cases gathered, the court notes potential 
faults of the sample analyzed in the regression analyses. In these 
cases, the court either notes that the sample analyzed was not 
the sample that should have been analyzed, or the court notes 
that the sample is too small to draw certain conclusions from the 
case.108 However, for a regression analysis to be statistically 
valid, the only requirement about sample size is that there are at 
least as many observations as parameters in the regression 
model.109 Sample size affects the power of the estimates—the 
probability that a statistically significant effect, if true, can be 
detected with the given sample size.110 Statistically significant 
results are less likely when the sample size is small.111 As noted 
by Daniel Rubinfeld, 
Other things being equal, the statistical significance of a 
regression coefficient increases as the sample size increases. 
Thus, a $1 per hour wage differential between men and 
women that was determined to be insignificantly different 
from zero with a sample of 20 men and women could be highly 
significant if the sample were increased to 200.112  
Valid conclusions can certainly be drawn from samples that are 
not very large, and finding statistically significant effects in 
                                                                                                     
 108. Infra Appendix A. 
 109. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 100, at 167  
For example, the unbiasedness of OLS (derived in Chapter 3) under 
the first four Gauss-Markov assumptions is a finite sample property 
because it holds for any sample size n (subject to the mild restriction 
that n must be at least as large as the total number of parameters in 
the regression model, k=1). 
 110. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 179, 192 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 2d ed. 
2000) (noting that a difference could be “statistically significant” if a large 
enough sample is studied).  
 111. See id. (describing the possibility of obtaining results that are 
“practically significant, but statistically insignificant,” particularly with small 
sample sizes).  
 112. Id. Notably, Rubinfeld uses a sample size of twenty as a comparison to 
a sample size of two hundred, which indicates that Rubinfeld considers a sample 
size of twenty to be acceptable for a regression analysis, subject only to the 
limitation that power is lower for a sample of twenty than for a sample of two 
hundred. 
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smaller sample sizes suggests that the estimated disparity is 
large, not that the estimates are invalid.113 Confidence intervals 
and tests of statistical significance take into account the sample 
size and thus account for the greater variability in estimates that 
arise from smaller sample sizes relative to larger sample sizes.114  
The unimportance of sample size is further demonstrated 
when the purpose of the regression analysis is not to draw 
conclusions beyond the sample or the employer under 
consideration. The regression analyses presented in employment 
discrimination cases are not meant to be representative of the 
entire U.S. population.115 Instead, these regressions are only 
meant to establish whether that plaintiff was treated differently 
than similarly situated coworkers due to his or her protected 
class under a disparate treatment claim or that one of the 
defendant’s policies had a disparate impact on members of a 
protected class.116 Furthermore, the sample size is inherently 
limited by the number of employees in a firm or, in the case of 
discrimination in hiring, the records of applicants maintained by 
the firm.117 Studies with similar goals and sample sizes as small 
as twenty observations have been the basis of articles published 
in reputable economic journals and often cited reports.118 It is 
quite easy to find studies published in major economic journals 
                                                                                                     
 113. See id. at 191–92 (noting that even minor differences can be 
statistically significant if a sufficiently large sample size is studied). 
 114. See id. at 192 (explaining that statistical significance is partially 
determined by the sample size).  
 115. See Browne, supra note 34, at 506 (noting that comparisons between 
the employer’s work force and the general population are not typically 
appropriate). 
 116. See id. at 478 (describing disparate treatment claims and disparate 
impact claims).  
 117. Note that Wal-Mart’s “tap on the shoulder” approach made it 
impossible to assess whether promotions from within were representative of 
applicants. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 148–49 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004) (describing the subjective factors involved in promotion and the “tap 
on the shoulder” approach).  
 118. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 100, at 167 (referencing regressions with 
samples sizes of twenty and seventy-two) (citing Ray C. Fair, Econometrics and 
Presidential Elections, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 98 (1996)); Leslie A. Whittington, 
James Alm & H. Elizabeth Peters, Fertility and the Personal Exemption: 
Implicit Pronatalist Policy in the United States, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 545, 545 
(1990).  
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with sample sizes that would be deemed too “small” by an 
opposing expert in an employment discrimination case.119 
Unfortunately, opposing experts and judges often refute 
regression analyses due to sample sizes that are of similar or 
even far larger sizes based on nothing more than their assertion 
that larger samples are required and without articulating any 
scientific basis to support their claim.120  
Reliable and strong conclusions can be drawn from small 
samples, especially when the studies do not draw externally valid 
conclusions, as is the case in the regression analyses presented in 
employment discrimination cases. As a result, as long as the 
plaintiff presents a regression analysis with a model that is 
properly specified, its admittance into the courtroom or the 
reliability of it should not be affected by sample size.  
Takeaway Two: Sample size affects only the statistical power 
and not the validity of the regression. Admissibility and 
reliability of regression evidence should not be based on 
sample size. 
C. Statistical Significance 
In close to 40% of the cases in our sample, the court notes a 
discrepancy in statistical significance. The court either notes that 
the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s experts drew conflicting 
conclusions about statistical significance or recognizes the lack of 
statistical significance of the variable of interest.121 Not 
surprisingly, many courts require that results from a regression 
analysis be statistically significant to draw conclusions from 
                                                                                                     
 119. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and 
Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 33 (2004) (reporting separate regressions 
for jury trials and bench trials based on 119 jury trials and 54 bench trials in 
Table Three); Joni Hersch, Alison F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, Voter 
Preferences and State Regulation of Smoking, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 455, 464–66 
(2004) (reporting regressions results in Tables Six, Seven, and Eight based on 
fifty states).  
 120. See, e.g., Coleman v. Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d. 593, 618–19 
(S.D. Tex. 2001) (finding that, although the sample size was not too small as a 
matter of law, it was not sufficiently reliable to support the plaintiffs’ claims of 
discrimination).  
 121. Infra Appendix A. 
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them.122 Many courts also require statistical significance of the 
results for regression analyses to enter the courtroom under 
evidentiary standards.123 But courts have demonstrated a 
fundamental confusion about what constitutes statistical 
significance, and this confusion is easily and frequently exploited, 
resulting in valid statistical evidence being deemed inadmissible.  
There are three separate but related issues to consider in any 
determination of statistical significance. First, what level of 
significance is required? Second, should tests be one-sided or two-
sided? Third, has the regression specification been manipulated 
to achieve a desired level of statistical significance? 
Regarding the first issue, some courts adopt a bright-line 
rule regarding the admissibility and reliance of regression results 
due to statistical significance. These rules prevent the reliance on 
data not significant at the 5% level (which in a two-sided test is a 
p-value of .05 or approximately two standard deviations).124 
However, as noted by the Northern District of Texas in Thomas v. 
Deloitte Consulting, L.P.,125 most courts, including the Fifth 
Circuit, have rejected such a bright-line standard.126 Even though 
these courts reject a bright-line standard, the courts often 
prevent analyses with results that fall short of the two standard 
deviation requirement but are statistically significant at levels 
recognized in academic research from entering the courtroom 
under Daubert. In Thomas, the Northern District of Texas 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Thomas v. Deloitte Consulting L.P., No. 3-02-CV-0343-M, 2004 WL 
1960097, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2004) (determining that a plaintiff may 
establish a prima facie case by using statistics if a gross disparity that is 
statistically significant is shown).  
 123. See id. at *5 (recognizing a bright-line rule for statistical significance 
that prevents evidence not significant at a 5% level from entering the 
courtroom). 
 124. See id. (citing several cases which established a bright-line rule of 
either 5% statistical significance or two standard deviations).  
 125. No. 3-02-CV-0343-M, 2004 WL 1960097 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2004).  
 126. See id. at *5 (recognizing that the Second, Third, Seventh, Fifth, and 
Eighth Circuits have rejected this bright-line standard and instead determine 
the statistical significance of a result on a case-by-case basis). The court also 
noted that the Fifth Circuit recognized in Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 
529, 544 (5th Cir. 1989), that statistical significance is dependent on sample 
size, and the sample size varied with each analysis. Id. The Supreme Court has 
not addressed this issue, and “most courts agree that there is no bright-line 
test.” 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (2011–2012). 
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recognized that “Daubert instructs that a court should consider 
the known or potential rate of error when assessing the scientific 
validity or reliability of expert testimony.”127 The court did not 
allow the plaintiff’s expert to present regression results showing 
a gender pay disparity that ranged between 7% and 10% 
significance in a two-sided test of significance, which corresponds 
to statistical significance in a one-sided test of 5%.128 The 
following passage illustrates the court’s decision: 
The court is unaware of any employment case where the jury 
was allowed to consider statistical evidence of discrimination 
that approached the 10% level used by Dr. Sobol. To the 
contrary, “[s]tatisticians tend to discard chance as an 
explanation for a result when deviations from the expected 
value approach two standard deviations.” Payne v. Travenol 
Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 821 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1038 (1982). Given the relatively small sample size 
used by Dr. Sobol, the court has little difficulty in concluding 
that a statistical deviation of 7% to 10% does not adequately 
rule out that the alleged disparities identified in her report 
were due to chance. As a result, Dr. Sobol will not be 
permitted to offer testimony regarding the results of her 
statistical analysis.129 
The court supported this decision by citing several other Fifth 
Circuit cases that required 5% significance (making it seem as if 
the court applied a bright-line rule).130 It is common practice in 
peer-reviewed research in economics to consider a result as 
“statistically significant” when the result is significant at the 10% 
level or less in a two-sided test.131 If courts use Daubert to remove 
                                                                                                     
 127. Thomas, 2004 WL 1960097, at *5 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993)).  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. (citing E.E.O.C. v. Ethan Allan, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 625, 635–
36 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (requiring two standard deviations)); Elliot Grp. Med. & 
Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 
(1984) (requiring a 5% level); Cooper v. Univ. of Tex. at Dall., 482 F. Supp. 187, 
194 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d, 648 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring a 5% level). 
 131. Many studies published in major economic journals report results that 
are significant at the 10% level for a two-sided test and discuss these results as 
statistically significant. See Joni Hersch, Home Production and Wages: Evidence 
from the American Time Use Survey, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 159, 167 (2009) 
(indicating levels of significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level); Joni Hersch & W. 
Kip Viscusi, Immigrant Status and the Value of Statistical Life, 45 J. HUM. RES. 
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results that are actually statistically significant, as the court did 
in Thomas and as the courts that adopt a bright-line 5% standard 
most certainly do, then valid and valuable evidence will not enter 
the courtroom.  
Second, courts rarely note whether the level of statistical 
significance required is for a one-sided or two-sided hypothesis 
test. In two 1977 decisions, the Supreme Court introduced the 
notion that differences that correspond to “two or three standard 
deviations” are in some way meaningful in supporting an 
inference of discrimination.132 Even this vague reference to “two 
or three standard deviations” reflects a fragile understanding of 
the meaning of statistical significance. There is a vast difference 
in the probability that a disparity of two standard deviations 
occurs by chance and the probability that a disparity of three 
standard deviations occurs by chance. Assuming we conduct two-
sided tests in a large sample, the probability that a disparity of 
two standard deviations occurs by chance is 4.55%, but the 
probability that a disparity of three standard deviations occurs by 
chance is a mere 0.27%. In two-sided tests, the two standard 
deviation criterion corresponds roughly to the 5% significance 
level commonly accepted in statistics.133 The three standard 
deviation criterion is well beyond a level of significance expected 
in statistics. In fact, even the more stringent 1% level of 
significance requires a standard deviation of only 2.56.134  
In suggesting the two or three standard deviations criterion 
for statistical significance, the Supreme Court was silent on 
whether they anticipated the statistical tests to be one-sided, 
meaning the test for discrimination examined whether the 
protected class was treated worse than the nonprotected class, or 
                                                                                                     
749, 758 (2010) (reporting results significant at the 5% and 10% level).  
 132. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (“As a general 
rule for such large samples, if the difference between the expected value and the 
observed number is greater than two or three standard deviations, then the 
hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social 
scientist.”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977) 
(“Because a fluctuation of more than two or three standard deviations would 
undercut the hypothesis that decisions were being made randomly with respect 
to race . . . .”). 
 133. The exact value in large samples is 1.96, not 2. 
 134. These statistics were calculated using Stata, based on the standard 
normal distribution. 
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two-sided, meaning the test for discrimination is simply that one 
party is treated differently than the other with no hypothesis 
about which party is preferred.135 That cases of discrimination 
reach the courts with ambiguity about which party is the victim 
of alleged discrimination seems implausible, and some courts 
have recognized this absurdity.136 The distinction between one-
sided and two-sided tests is often crucial.137 In a one-sided test, 
the 5% level of significance is reached with 1.645 standard 
deviations. In a two-sided test, the 5% level is reached with 1.96 
standard deviations.138 However, both the level of significance 
and whether the hypotheses tests must be one-sided or two-sided 
(also referred to as “one-tailed” and “two-tailed”) determine 
whether any given result is “statistically significant.”139 As Daniel 
Rubinfeld writes in a federal court guide to regression analyses: 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17 (identifying that a difference 
greater than two or three standard deviations is suspect, but not identifying 
whether the test was one-sided); Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 311 n.17 
(noting that fluctuations of more than two or three standard deviations do not 
support claims that decisions were made randomly, but failing to identify 
whether the tests were one-sided); see also Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F. 2d 84, 92 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the Supreme Court has not provided explicit 
guidance on the issue of one-tailed or two-tailed approaches).  
 136. See Palmer, 815 F.2d at 95 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that claims of 
alleged discrimination involved complaints about both under- and over-
selection, and that “statistically significant deviations in either direction from 
an equality in selection rates would constitute a prima facie case of unlawful 
discrimination” possibly leading to confusion about which party is the victim of 
discrimination).  
 137. See Rubinfeld, Reference Guide, supra note 110, at 195 (noting that the 
choice of either a one- or two-tailed test may affect an expert’s acceptance or 
rejection of a null hypothesis).  
 138. This is explained clearly in Palmer v. Schultz: 
How can a 5% probability of randomness correspond both to a 
measurement of two standard deviations and a measurement of 1.65 
standard deviations, one may reasonably ask? There is a legitimate 
answer: it depends on whether one is using a “one-tailed” or a 
“two-tailed” test of statistical significance. A disparity measuring 1.65 
standard deviations corresponds to a 5% probability of randomness 
under a one-tailed test. A disparity measuring two standard 
deviations (to be more precise, 1.96 standard deviations) corresponds 
to a 5% probability of randomness under a two-tailed test.  
Palmer, 815 F.2d at 92.  
 139. See id. at 93 (explaining that a number’s statistical significance varies 
depending on whether a one-tailed or two-tailed test is used).  
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When the expert evaluates the null hypothesis that a variable 
of interest has no association with a dependent variable 
against the alternative hypothesis that there is an association, 
a two-tailed test, which allows for the effect to be either 
positive or negative, is usually appropriate. A one-tailed test 
would usually be applied when the expert believes, perhaps on 
the basis of other direct evidence presented at trial, that the 
alternative hypothesis is either positive or negative, but not 
both. For example, an expert might use a one-tailed test in a 
patent infringement case if he or she strongly believes that the 
effect of the alleged infringement on the price of the infringed 
product was either zero or negative.140 
The third issue that courts often misunderstand is that, by 
adding additional explanatory variables that may or may not be 
relevant, statistical significance can often easily be manipulated 
to tip the level of significance below any purported cutoff value. 
In Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp.,141 by adding in an 
additional sixty-seven variables to indicate month-year that a 
loan was made, the defendant was able to drive a p-value from 
.073 (statistically significant at the 5% level in a one-sided test) to 
.107, even though as a group, these additional sixty-seven month-
year variables were statistically irrelevant.142  
Courts also decrease the reliance of regression results when 
they misinterpret other measures of statistical significance. For 
example, in Sears, the Seventh Circuit correctly referred to z-
values as the “number of standard deviations between the actual 
and expected figures.”143 The court, however, then referred to a z-
value of 3.6 as “barely statistically significant” and a z-value of 
2.9 as “less than statistically significant.”144 In reality, z-values of 
3.6 and 2.9 are equivalent to p-values of less than .001 in a 
                                                                                                     
 140. See Rubinfeld, Reference Guide, supra note 110, at 194.  
 141. 28 F. App’x 392, 394 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-6483) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 142. Expert Report for Plaintiff, Supplemental Report on Racial Impact of 
NMAC’s Finance Charge Markup Policy at 45, Cason v. Nissan Motor 
Acceptance Corp., 28 F. App'x 392, 394 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-6483) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). We calculated the F-statistic from 
these reports to independently determine the additional variables were 
statistically insignificant. 
 143. E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 323 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 144. Id. at 335–36. 
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standard normal distribution.145 As a result, these z-values of 3.6 
and 2.9 easily reach the standard for statistical significance 
(instead of being “barely statistically significant”) at the 5% level 
in both one-sided and two-sided tests.146 
One scholar has suggested that experts simply present p-
values, instead of using the term “statistically significant,” so 
that the jury can decide whether the statistical evidence is 
reliable.147 This argument has some merit because the defendants 
would then be able to present evidence arguing that the level of 
significance is below any reasonable standard of reliability.148 
However, due to general concerns with the presentation of expert 
testimony (as discussed in Part II.B, supra), the court may want 
to use its gatekeeping role under Daubert to keep out results that 
do not meet the level of significance typically reported as 
meaningful in peer-reviewed publications—significance at the 
10% level. 
Takeaway Three: Employment discrimination tests should 
always be one-sided tests and results that are significant at 
the 10% level should always be considered “statistically 
significant.”  
IV. A Statistical Analysis of Econometrics in the Courtroom 
As illustrated above, regression analyses often provide 
critical evidence in employment discrimination claims, but the 
evidence can quickly be diminished by the opposing party’s often 
                                                                                                     
 145. See DEP’T OF STATISTICS, TEX. A&M UNIV., STANDARD NORMAL 
DISTRIBUTION, https://www.stat.tamu.edu/~lzhou/stat302/standardnormaltable.p
df (listing p-values for a range of z-values). 
 146. See Tests of Significance, YALE UNIV. DEP’T OF STATISTICS, 
http://www.stat.yale.edu/Courses/1997-98/101/sigtest.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 
2014) (describing significance levels for p-values at various percent levels) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 147. See D. H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. 
L. REV. 1333, 1339–40 (1986) (“As to the finding’s admissibility, the issue is 
whether the testimony that the numbers are ‘significant’ sufficiently advances 
the understanding of the trier of fact to be worth the effort consumed in its 
presentation and explanation.”). 
 148. See id. at 1344–45 (noting that statistical significance at the .05 level 
does not objectively prove a proposition as true and that “[s]tatistical evidence 
need not be dispositive to be helpful in building a prima facie case”).  
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invalid critiques. While anecdotal and theoretical evidence of this 
problem is very persuasive, statistical evidence could inform the 
extent of the problem. We gathered a sample of employment 
discrimination cases in which one of the parties (generally the 
plaintiff) presented regression analyses with the hope of gaining 
more insight into the problem through sample statistics and our 
own regression analyses. We hoped to answer the following 
questions: (1) Do plaintiffs who present regression analyses in the 
sample of employment discrimination cases benefit from the 
evidence? (2) Is the value of the evidence diminished if the 
opposing party also presents regression analyses? (3) How often 
does the court acknowledge an opposing party’s critiques of the 
regression analyses? And (4) does the acknowledgment of those 
critiques further negate the introduction of the analyses? 
A. Data 
To answer each of the above questions, we searched for all 
Title VII employment discrimination federal court decisions 
available on Westlaw since 2000 that mention “regression 
analysis.” Specifically, we limited the Westlaw search to Title VII 
cases published between January 2000 and October 2013 
containing the words “regression analysis.” This search resulted 
in a sample of seventy-eight cases.149 The citations to each case 
are listed in Table A of the Appendix. Because this sample was 
gathered from a Westlaw search, this analysis does not represent 
all employment discrimination cases in which plaintiffs presented 
regression analyses; however, we believe it still provides valuable 
information about how courts and juries address the introduction 
of regression analyses in employment discrimination cases. The 
total sample is comprised of summary judgment motions, 
evidentiary motions, trial verdicts, and both district court and 
court of appeals opinions. 
After reading each decision, we coded the following 
characteristics of the case: whether it was a class action; the type 
of discrimination claim made; whether the EEOC represented the 
charging party; and whether a disparate impact claim was made. 
                                                                                                     
 149. See supra note 95 (discussing the Westlaw search and the resulting 
sample).  
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Most importantly, we noted the outcome of the motion or trial, 
and we noted which parties presented regression analyses 
supporting their claims. The result of the claim was coded as the 
result reported in the opinion being analyzed. We then coded 
whether the result was favorable for the plaintiff or the 
defendant. For example, if the motion to exclude the plaintiff’s 
statistical evidence was denied, then the result was coded as 
being in favor of the plaintiff. On the other hand, if the motion 
was granted, then the result was coded as being in favor of the 
defendant.150 Many of these evidentiary motions are not followed 
by trials with published opinions (as the case might have been 
settled or the opinion not published). As a result, the final 
outcome of the case is not necessarily the outcome that we 
analyzed. 
B. General Summary Statistics 
In a 1991 study, Catherine Connolly analyzed forty 
employment discrimination cases in which one of the parties 
presented regression analysis.151 Connolly found that plaintiffs 
who presented regression analyses were most likely to prevail 
when both parties presented regression analyses, but that the 
plaintiff only prevailed 52.5% of the time.152 Connolly also found 
that the plaintiffs did not receive a comparative advantage when 
they were the only party to submit regression analyses.153 In 
addition, Connolly compared the plaintiff’s highest chance of 
winning (52.5%) to previous estimations of a plaintiff’s chance of 
prevailing in an employment discrimination case (or motion), 
                                                                                                     
150. Occasionally, multiple motions are addressed in one opinion with some 
in favor of the defendant and some in favor of the plaintiff. These opinions were 
also coded as in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. For example if both 
parties’ motions to bar expert evidence were denied, and the class was certified, 
the opinion was coded as in the plaintiffs’ favor.  
 151. See Catherine Connolly, The Use of a Multiple Regression Analysis in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 10 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 117, 123 
(1991) (noting that in twenty of those cases, both parties presented regression 
analysis; in twelve cases, only the plaintiff presented a regression; and in eight 
cases, only the defendant presented a regression).  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
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which ranged from 31%–58%.154 This comparison suggested that, 
as of 1991, presenting a regression analysis did not increase the 
plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing, which, assuming the 
regressions were valid, it should.155 For a first look at our sample, 
we computed statistics similar to Connolly’s statistics. 
In our sample, the plaintiff presented a regression in all but 
four of the seventy-eight cases (94.87%). In addition, the plaintiff 
was the only party to present a regression in 51.28% of the cases, 
and the defendant was the only party to present a regression in 
only 5.13% of the cases.156 These statistics are not surprising 
because, as Connolly recognized as well, the plaintiff has the 
burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and, in 
the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiff must submit 
circumstantial evidence (including statistical evidence) to 
establish a rebuttable prima facie case.157 In fact, “[s]tatistical 
evidence is indispensable to a claim of disparate impact because 
the claim is that the challenged practice has an adverse effect on 
a group, not merely on an individual,”158 and as a result, 66.67% 
of the sample presented a disparate impact claim. Also, as 
discussed in Part II, plaintiffs frequently (even after Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes) use regression analyses to establish class 
                                                                                                     
 154. Id. at 122 (citing Paul Burstein, Attacking Sex Discrimination in the 
Labor Market: A Study in Law and Politics, 67 SOC. FORCES 641, 657 (1989)). 
However, the plaintiff was at a disadvantage when the plaintiff did not present 
a regression and the defendant did. Id. at 123.  
 155. See id. at 122–23 (noting that plaintiffs had success between 31%–58% 
of the time with or without the use of regression analysis).  
 156. It was not clear in every reported opinion whether the defendant 
presented a regression analysis. If it was not clear that the defendant did not 
present a regression analysis, then it was assumed that the defendant did not 
present such results. 
 157. See Connolly, supra note 151, at 122 (“The more extensive use of 
regression analysis by plaintiffs may reflect the ordering of the burden of proof 
in an employment discrimination case.”). Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, the plaintiff generally must establish that: “(i) he belongs to a racial 
minority; (ii) he applied and was qualified for a job the employer was trying to 
fill; (iii) though qualified, he was rejected; and (iv) thereafter the employer 
continued to seek applicants with complainant’s qualifications.” 411 U.S. 792, 
792–93 (1973). Plaintiffs often present statistical evidence to meet and 
strengthen requirement (iii); however, courts have recognized that statistical 
evidence alone is not enough, and, as a result, 94% of the sample also presented 
anecdotal evidence. Browne, supra note 34, at 481.  
 158. Browne, supra note 34, at 479. 
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commonality, and over 75% of our sample involved a class 
action.159 Regression analyses are also the “core” of pattern or 
practice claims, which generally underlie class action cases.160 
Table 1 presents these summary statistics. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Characteristic Percent of Cases  
with Characteristic 
Plaintiff Only Party to Present Regression 51.28% (40) 
Defendant Only Party to Present Regression 5.13%   (4) 
Plaintiff & Defendant Present Regression 43.59% (34) 
Class Action 76.92% (60) 
EEOC Representation 6.41%   (5) 
Disparate Impact Claim Made 66.67% (52) 
Disparate Impact Was the Only Claim Made 23.08% (18) 
This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII 
cases in which a party submitted a regression analysis. These cases 
were decided during January 2000–October 2013. The number of cases 
analyzed is seventy-eight. The number of cases with each 
characteristic is indicated in parentheses. 
Nielsen et al. analyzed the outcome of a sample of 
employment discrimination cases filed in federal court during 
1988 to 2003.161 Their study reported that 6% of the employment 
discrimination cases they analyzed went to trial, and, of those 
6%, the plaintiffs won 33% of the time.162 In addition, of those 
cases that went to summary judgment, the plaintiffs prevailed 
approximately 43% of the time.163 Nielsen et al.’s sample 
represents a broader sample than the sample analyzed in this 
Article, which is limited to cases in which regression analysis is 
presented. In our sample, the plaintiff wins 41.03% of the time. 
                                                                                                     
 159. See id. at 478–79 (describing the role of statistical evidence in a class 
action or pattern-or-practice case). 
 160. See Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 2000) (“In a pattern and 
practice disparate treatment case, statistical evidence constitutes the core of a 
plaintiff's prima facie case.”).  
 161. Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual 
Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation 
in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 181 
(2010).  
 162. Id. at 187. 
 163. Id. at 184. 
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Unlike in Connolly’s sample,164 in our sample, the plaintiff is 
most likely to win if they are the only party to present a 
regression (55%) and that percentage falls to 23.53% when the 
defendant also introduces a regression.165 These percentages are 
presented in Table 2. When comparing these percentages to those 
presented in Nielsen et al., the plaintiff is actually at a 
comparative disadvantage when both parties present a regression 
analysis, as the plaintiff prevailed between 33%–43% in Nielsen’s 
sample.166 In addition, the plaintiff only gains a small 
comparative advantage when they are the only party to present a 
regression (55%).  
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Plaintiff Result 
Characteristic Percent of Cases 
with  
Plaintiff Result 
Plaintiff Only Party to Present Regression 55.00% (22/40) 
Defendant Only Party to Present Regression 50.00%     (2/4) 
Plaintiff & Defendant Present Regression 23.53%   (8/34) 
This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII 
cases in which a party submitted a regression analysis. These cases 
were decided during January 2000–October 2013. The number of cases 
analyzed is seventy-eight. The number of cases with plaintiff result out 
of the total number of cases with the characteristic is indicated in 
parentheses. 
C. Statistical Findings Related to the Three Critiques 
Assuming that the plaintiff presented a valid regression 
showing that the plaintiff was disadvantaged due to being a 
member of a protected class, the regression analysis should, on 
average, increase the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing over the 
                                                                                                     
 164. Connolly, supra note 151, at 123. 
 165. Strangely, in our sample, the plaintiff wins 50% of the time when the 
defendant is the only party to present a regression. This sample is very small 
(n=4).  
 166. Nielsen et al., supra note 161, at 184. Our sample is not directly 
comparable to Nielsen et al. because this sample is limited to those with 
regression analysis and because the sample includes the outcomes of 
evidentiary motions in addition to the outcomes of trials and summary 
judgment motions. Our sample is also limited to reported cases.  
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defendant.167 However, as evidenced by Connolly (1991) and by 
the updated analysis presented here, this increase does not 
actually occur.168 This is likely because the defendant, even when 
not presenting a regression analysis, challenges the validity of 
the plaintiff’s regression analysis by challenging the statistical 
methods used.169 These challenges are usually based on the 
econometric critiques discussed above (omitted variables, sample 
size, and statistical significance).170 In almost 90% of the cases 
analyzed, the court or opposing expert mentions at least one of 
these critiques.171  
Table 3 presents summary statistics that show how often 
three econometric critiques are mentioned in the published 
opinions of our sample. These critiques were the three most 
common critiques mentioned by the court: omitted variables, 
inadequate sample, and a lack of statistical significance. As 
discussed above, these critiques are only valid in certain 
circumstances.172 The statistics presented in Table 3 are limited 
to the cases where the plaintiff submitted a regression analysis, 
as our analysis focused on whether the plaintiff benefits by 
presenting such statistics in Title VII cases. We coded these 
                                                                                                     
 167. See supra Part II.B (discussing the incentives for the plaintiff to 
present a valid regression analysis).  
 168. See Connolly, supra note 151, at 122–23 (noting that the plaintiff has a 
similar probability of prevailing over the defendant with or without the use of 
regression analysis).  
 169. See id. at 123 (“Defendants . . . often successfully argue that the 
plaintiffs’ computer print outs, mathematical equations, and university experts 
present a distorted view of the work environment. These defendants argue that 
personnel policies and practices are far too complicated to be reduced to a 
statistical showing.”). 
 170. See supra Part III (analyzing three common econometric critiques).  
 171. Infra Table 3. If the court in any way referenced the regression analysis 
not including every relevant variable, we coded the opinion as referencing 
omitted variables. If the court in any way referenced the regression analysis not 
analyzing the correct sample or analyzing a sample that was too small, we coded 
the opinion as referencing critiques associated with the sample. If the court in 
any way mentioned that the regression results were not statistically significant 
or the fact that the opposing party challenged the level of significance, we coded 
the opinion as referencing statistical significance. Even if the court correctly 
analyzed these critiques, we still coded the court as referencing the critique in 
the opinion.  
 172. See supra Part III (discussing the validity of the three common 
econometric critiques).  
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critiques as present in an opinion regardless of whether the court 
or opposing expert correctly analyzed them.173 Table 3 shows that 
the court discussed omitted variables in 63.51% of the cases. In 
addition, the court mentioned critiques associated with the 
sample (whether it was the correct sample or whether it was too 
small) in 62.16% of the cases, and the court mentioned critiques 
associated with statistical significance in 39.19% of the cases. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Econometric Critiques 
Econometric Critique Percent of Cases Presented 
Omitted Variables 63.51% (47) 
Sample  62.16% (46) 
Statistical Significance 39.19% (29) 
Any Critique 89.19% (66) 
This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII 
cases. We exclude the four cases in which only the defendant presented 
a regression analysis. These cases were decided during January 2000–
October 2013. The number of cases analyzed is seventy-four. The 
number of cases with the econometric critique is indicated in 
parentheses. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics illustrating how often 
the plaintiff received a favorable result in opinions where the 
plaintiff presented a regression analysis and the court mentioned 
any of the three econometric critiques summarized in Table 3. As 
Table 4 illustrates, when the plaintiff presents regression results 
and any critique is mentioned, the plaintiff wins in 36.36% of the 
cases. This percentage is less than the percent of the total sample 
that wins when the plaintiff presents a regression analysis 
(40.54%).174 In addition, the percentage of plaintiff verdicts is 
even smaller when omitted variables are discussed (31.91%).  
                                                                                                     
 173. In many cases, we could not discern whether the court correctly 
analyzed the critique or whether the critique was valid because we only had the 
published opinion available.  
 174. See supra Table 2 (obtaining this statistic from the total number of 
plaintiff results in this study, or 31/78).  
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Plaintiff Result when Econometric 
Critique Discussed 
Econometric Critique Present of Cases With Plaintiff 
Result 
Omitted Variables 31.91% (15/47) 
Sample  39.13% (18/46) 
Statistical Significance 37.93% (11/29) 
Any Critique 36.36% (24/66) 
This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII 
cases. This data is limited to cases in which the plaintiff submitted a 
regression analysis. We exclude the four cases in which only the 
defendant presented a regression analysis. These cases were decided 
during January 2000–October 2013. The number of cases analyzed is 
seventy-four. The number of cases with plaintiff result out of the 
total number of cases with the econometric critique is indicated in 
parentheses. 
Because contradictory statistics are not presented, a plaintiff 
should benefit most from presenting regression analyses when 
the plaintiff is the only party to present such statistical evidence. 
Table 2 illustrated that plaintiffs were more likely to receive a 
favorable result in cases with regression analyses when they were 
the only party to present such analyses. Table 5 presents 
summary statistics that show how often the court mentions 
econometric critiques even when the defendant does not present a 
regression analysis. As a result, Table 5 is limited to cases in 
which the plaintiff is the only party to present regression 
analyses. Comparing the second column of Table 5 to the 
statistics in Table 3 illustrates that the court is slightly less likely 
(82.50% compared to 89.19%) to discuss econometric critiques 
when the plaintiff is the only party to present a regression 
analysis. The third column of Table 5 shows that even when the 
plaintiff is the only party to present a regression analysis, the 
plaintiff has a smaller chance of winning when any critique is 
presented (48.48%) as compared to the total sample of plaintiffs 
that prevail when the plaintiff is the only party to present a 
regression analysis (55%). Not surprisingly, the percentages 
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reported in column three of Table 5 are larger than those 
presented in Table 4 because the plaintiff is more likely to receive 
a favorable result when the plaintiff is the only party to present a 
regression analysis.  
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Plaintiff Result when Plaintiff is the 
Only Party to Present Regressions and Critique is Presented 
Critique Percent of Cases 
Presented 
Present of Cases 
With Plaintiff 
Result 
Omitted Variables 57.50% (23) 43.48% (10/23) 




40.00% (16) 37.50%   (6/16) 
Any Critique 82.50% (33) 48.48% (16/33) 
This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII 
cases. This data is limited to cases in which the plaintiff is the only 
party to submit a regression analysis. We exclude the four cases in 
which only the defendant presented a regression analysis. These cases 
were decided during January 2000–October 2013. The number of 
cases analyzed is forty. In the second column, the number of cases in 
which the critique is presented is reported in parentheses. In the third 
column, the number of cases with a plaintiff result out of the total 
number of cases in which the critique is presented is reported in 
parentheses. 
D. Regression Results 
To determine more accurately the consequences of an 
opposing party presenting contradicting regression analyses and 
critiques of the plaintiff’s analysis, we conducted our own 
regression analyses. Each regression controls for major 
characteristics that we believe may affect the outcome of an 
employment discrimination case. In each analysis, the dependent 
variable is the outcome of the case or motion, and each regression 
controls for major characteristics that we believe may affect the 
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outcome of an employment discrimination case. These 
characteristics are whether the case is a class action and whether 
the plaintiff was represented by the EEOC. We believe that 
plaintiffs in these cases may present more statistical evidence, 
which may affect the likelihood that the defendant challenges 
that evidence. In addition, the specifications control for whether 
the party presented only a disparate impact claim, as opposed to 
a disparate treatment claim or both claims, which may affect the 
likelihood that they prevail.  
The variables of interest in our regression analysis are 
whether the defendant presented a regression and whether the 
reported opinion mentioned any of the discussed critiques. The 
dependent variable is whether the plaintiff received a favorable 
outcome, either at trial, from a summary judgment motion, from 
an evidentiary motion, or from a class action certification. Our 
regression analysis analyzes the seventy-four cases in which the 
plaintiff presented a regression analysis, as we are interested in 
the defendant challenging those regressions. The results of the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are reported in Table 6 
and show that, if the defendant presents a regression, the 
plaintiff is 28.8 percentage points less likely to have a favorable 
result. In addition, if the opinion mentions any of the econometric 
critiques (omitted variables, statistical significance, or sample 
deficiencies), then the plaintiff is 28.8 percentage points less 
likely to have a favorable result. Both of these results are 
significant at the 5% level in a two-sided test.175  
  
                                                                                                     
 175. As a result, this evidence should be submitted to a jury if presented in 
court. 
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Table 6: OLS Regression Results: Dependent Variable Plaintiff Result 
Variable Coefficient 


















Number of Observations 74 
This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title 
VII cases in which the plaintiff submitted a regression analysis. 
These cases were decided during January 2000–October 2013. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels in a two-sided 
test, respectively. 
Table 7 presents results of a regression analysis that is 
limited to cases in which the plaintiff is the only party to submit 
regression analysis as evidence. Because of our sample 
construction, this regression does not control for whether the 
defendant presented a regression. These results show that the 
plaintiff is even more disadvantaged by critiques being discussed 
in an opinion when they are the only party to present a 
regression, as they are 36.0 percentage points less likely to 
receive a favorable result.  
Although these results are limited because the sample is 
comprised only of cases and motions with published opinions, 
these results do show that the plaintiff is disadvantaged when 
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econometric critiques, which may actually be flawed, are 
presented in court. Due to this strong result, this Article stresses 
the importance of the court exercising its gatekeeping role under 
Daubert in response to these critiques being presented. It also 
stresses the importance of the court and of the experts having an 
understanding of when these econometric critiques are actually 
invalid. 
Table 7: OLS Regression Results for Cases Where Plaintiff is the Only 
Party to Present Regression Results: Dependent Variable Plaintiff Result 
Variable Coefficient 
Any Critique Present -0.360*** 
(0.111) 
















This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII 
cases in which the plaintiff submitted a regression analysis. These 
cases were decided during January 2000–October 2013. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels in a two-sided test, 
respectively. 
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V. Examples of the Use and Misuse of Econometrics in Our 
Sample 
The following examples from our sample of cases illustrate 
how the court has recently acknowledged the three critiques that 
were most often discussed in our sample. These examples show 
that the court is capable of correctly recognizing when the 
critiques are valid, but they also provide examples of how invalid 
critiques can lead the court astray.  
A. Omitted Variables Examples 
In Sears, the Northern District of Illinois completely 
misstated omitted variable bias: “However, the sex coefficient 
reflects not only the effect of sex, but also the residual effect of 
any factor which affects salary that is not included in the model. 
Thus, if important variables are omitted, the effect of sex on 
compensation estimated by the model will be artificially 
inflated.”176 Unfortunately, even after Bazemore, courts and 
opposing experts mischaracterize omitted variable bias and often 
do not focus on whether omitted variable bias is present in a 
regression. Instead, courts simply focus on the fact that variables 
that may explain part of the dependent variable are absent.177 In 
addition, courts continue to allow defendants to present these 
arguments to the jury.178 Within our sample of cases, there are 
examples of courts generally discussing omitted variables as a 
potential problem, as well as examples of the court incorrectly 
characterizing the problem. There are also examples of the courts 
correctly applying Bazemore and correctly recognizing when 
omitting certain variables is not an issue.  
A more recent example of a court generally discussing the 
problem is the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s discussion in 
Morgan v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.179 To establish 
                                                                                                     
 176. E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 
1986).  
 177. Id. 
 178. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 159 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (recognizing defendant’s omitted variables critique).  
 179. 143 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1151 (E.D. Mo. 2000). 
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race discrimination in wages, the plaintiff’s expert presented a 
regression that controlled for the previous two performance 
evaluations but did not control for every performance 
evaluation.180 When the opposing expert controlled for each 
evaluation in the regression, the coefficient on the variable 
indicating that the individual was black became insignificant.181 
The large increase in the number of variables within the equation 
(every evaluation instead of two) alone can result in lower 
statistical significance of explanatory variables.182 However, this 
alternative explanation was never presented to the judge and 
never mentioned in the opinion. Even though the opposing expert 
did not show that these additional evaluations were negatively 
correlated with race and positively correlated with wage, nor did 
the expert show that taken as a group the additional explanatory 
variables resulted in a statistically significant improvement in 
explanatory power rather than merely a successful ruse to 
eliminate statistical significance in the original regression, the 
court concluded that the additional variables should be included 
in the regression and that the wage disparity between black and 
white managers was due to factors other than race.183  
There are additional examples in our sample where a court 
accepted the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s regression 
is flawed due to omitted variables without requiring that the 
defendant establish the relationships discussed in Takeaway 
One.184 In Carpenter v. Boeing Co.,185 the defendant, Boeing, 
argued that the plaintiff’s study did not “show that the 
‘something’ causing men to work more overtime than women is 
                                                                                                     
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (noting that increasing 
the number of variables can manipulate the statistical significance).  
 183. See Morgan, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52 (finding that the defendant’s 
expert properly included the additional variables and noting that the plaintiffs 
presented insufficient evidence to provide a basis for excluding the additional 
variables).  
 184. See, e.g., Franklin v. Local 2 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 565 
F.3d 508, 518 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding the plaintiffs’ statistical analysis 
unreliable because of omitted variables); Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 
1183, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the omitted variable as a flaw in the 
plaintiffs’ regression analysis). 
 185. 456 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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the manager discretion that Plaintiffs have identified as the 
challenged employment practice” due to an omitted variable.186 
While the Tenth Circuit discussed the relationships that the 
omitted variable (department assignment) had with the outcome 
(overtime hours) and with the variable of interest (the protected 
class, in this case, female), it did not require the defendant to 
prove those relationships statistically or to prove that the 
inclusion of the variable affected the significance of the result.187 
The court upheld the lower court’s decision denying class 
certification, in part, because of the flaws associated with the 
statistical analysis.188 
In Franklin v. Local 2 of the Sheet Metal Workers 
International Association,189 the Eighth Circuit reviewed the 
lower court’s holding that “Dr. Gutman’s report [was] not reliable 
because of the assumptions he m[ade], unsupported conclusions 
he dr[ew], and variables he fail[ed] to consider in rendering his 
opinion.”190 While the Eighth Circuit did discuss certain 
important relationships with the claimed omitted variables, it 
also quoted an earlier decision: 
The burden is on the opposing party to clearly rebut statistical 
evidence; hypotheses or conjecture will not suffice. When a 
plaintiff submits accurate statistical data, and a defendant 
alleges that relevant variables are excluded, defendant may 
not rely on hypothesis to lessen the probative value of 
plaintiff’s statistical proof. Rather, defendant, in his rebuttal 
presentation, must either rework plaintiff's statistics 
incorporating the omitted factors or present other proof 
undermining plaintiff's claims.191 
While this quote may seem to be in line with Takeaway One, as it 
requires some form of statistical proof that the variables are 
relevant, reworking the regression with the omitted variables 
                                                                                                     
 186. Id. at 1196. 
 187. See id. at 1195–96 (analyzing the experts’ statistical findings). 
 188. See id. at 1203–04 (discussing the court’s reasoning for finding the 
plaintiffs’ statistical analysis deficient).  
 189. 565 F.3d 508 (8th Cir. 2009).  
 190. Id. at 514 (alternations in original) (quoting Franklin v. Sheet Metal 
Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 2, No. 06-0004-CV-W-GAF, 2008 WL 
2819372, at *3 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 2008)). 
 191. Id. at 517 (quoting Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 6, 682 F.2d 721, 
730 (8th Cir. 1982)).  
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does not establish each of the required relationships; even if the 
variable of interest is no longer significant, the relationship with 
the omitted variable and the variable of interest is not proven.192 
In addition, an increase in the number of variables within the 
equation alone can result in lower statistical significance of 
explanatory variables.193 
Fortunately, there are also examples in our sample of cases 
correctly applying Bazemore and not allowing claims of omitted 
variables to preclude the introduction of valid statistical evidence 
in employment discrimination cases. In Derrickson v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc.,194 the District of Maryland denied the defendant’s 
motions for summary judgment and to exclude the plaintiff’s 
expert report.195 The plaintiff’s expert report included results of a 
regression analysis that showed statistical disparities in 
promotion rates because of race.196 The defendants sought to 
exclude the report, arguing that the regressions were flawed 
because they failed to control for store location.197 The court then 
correctly cited Bazemore and denied the motion to exclude.198 In 
fact, the court also correctly recognized that the plaintiff’s expert 
did include store location in some regressions and found 
promotional differences that were statistically insignificant only 
due to sample size.199 This discussion showed that the court 
understood the elements of Takeaway One and Takeaway Two, 
discussed below. 
                                                                                                     
 192.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing the required 
relationships). 
 193. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (noting that increasing 
the number of variables can manipulate the statistical significance).  
 194. 84 F. Supp. 2d 679 (D. Md. 2000). 
 195. See id. at 689–90 (denying the motions related to the defendant’s 
challenge of statistical evidence offered to demonstrate employment 
discrimination).  
 196. Id. at 689. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. at 689–90 (noting that omission of a variable does not 
automatically render “an analysis which accounts for the major factors . . . 
unacceptable as evidence of discrimination” (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478 
U.S. 385, 402 (1986))).  
 199. See id. at 690 (“Finally, Dr. Medoff did run the regression analysis to 
include store location as a variable and still found promotional differences to 
exist favoring whites. However, because the location variable reduced the 
sample sizes, many of the results were statistically insignificant.”). 
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In Lavin-McEleney v. Marist College,200 the Second Circuit 
also got it right when a defendant presented similar challenges to 
the plaintiff’s statistical evidence.201 In Marist College, the 
plaintiff presented regression analyses to support a claim of sex 
discrimination in wages.202 These regressions controlled for 
characteristics that could influence each professor’s wage 
separately from his or her sex.203 These characteristics included 
each professor’s rank, years of service, division, tenure status, 
and degrees earned.204 Even after controlling for these variables, 
the coefficient for female was negative and significant, indicating 
statistically significant lower salaries for female employees.205 As 
the Second Circuit recognized, the lower court properly admitted 
this statistical evidence despite the defendant’s objections.206 
Also, despite the defendant’s expert’s contention that 
counterparts should only be compared on a departmental basis, 
the plaintiff’s results were presented to the jury (as were the 
defendant’s results that showed an insignificant gender-pay 
disparity).207 Ultimately, the jury found that this evidence and 
additional anecdotal evidence supported a valid claim under the 
Equal Pay Act.208 As a result, the district court awarded the 
plaintiff back pay and attorney’s fees.209 
                                                                                                     
 200. 239 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 201. See id. at 478–79 (explaining the defendant’s objection to the plaintiff’s 
statistical findings). 
 202.  Id. at 478. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  See id. at 482 (holding that the plaintiff’s regression analysis “properly 
supported plaintiff’s case and was appropriately employed to calculate 
damages”). 
 207. Id. at 478–79. 
 208. See id. at 479 (“The jury found for the plaintiff on the Equal Pay Act 
claim, but decided that Marist’s violation of the Act was not willful.”). The 
special verdict form “instructed the jury not to consider plaintiff’s Title VII 
violation if it found that Marist’s violation of the Equal Pay Act was not willful.” 
Id. Accordingly, “the jury did not find Marist liable on plaintiff’s Title VII 
claim.” Id. 
 209. See id. (noting the district court’s decision to amend the judgment in 
the plaintiff’s favor and award her back pay, attorney’s fees, liquidated 
damages, and costs). 
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In Tabor v. Hilti, Inc.,210 the most recent case in our sample, 
the court correctly analyzed omitted variable bias and almost 
directly addressed the points discussed in Takeaway One.211 
Although the Northern District of Oklahoma ultimately found for 
the defendant on the disparate impact claim of gender 
discrimination, the court correctly rejected the defendant’s 
arguments challenging the plaintiff’s regression analyses.212 The 
court concluded as a matter of law that the failure to include 
priority ratings in the regression analysis did not render the 
regressions unreliable or unsound because the regressions 
“controlled for important variables other than sex that could 
impact promotion rates.”213 In fact, the court followed that finding 
with an even more detailed conclusion:  
Dr. Killingsworth’s decision to not control for SMD mobility 
ratings does not render his analysis unreliable. In a regression 
analysis, mobility preferences would only change the 
statistical significance of the sex variable if mobility 
preferences differed by sex. However, Hilti provides no 
trustworthy data demonstrating that the mobility preferences 
of women differ from men among Base Market employees. 
Because the court may not presume such differences, the 
failure to control for mobility preferences does not make Dr. 
Killingsworth’s analysis unreliable.214 
This conclusion almost directly restates Takeaway One, showing 
that perhaps some courts are aware of the false critiques that 
expert witnesses present when attempting to impugn the 
reliability of valid statistical evidence presented by plaintiffs. 
While it remains routine for defendants to attempt to refute 
regression analyses by claiming that omitted variables cause the 
illegal disparities, experts and judges must remember (as some 
courts in our sample have) that omitting variables that are 
expected to affect the dependent variable does not always lead to 
                                                                                                     
 210. No. 09-cv-189-GKF-PJC, 2013 WL 4068781 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 12, 2013).  
 211. See id. at *9 (analyzing the plaintiff’s expert’s findings and noting that 
the omitted variable “does not render his analysis unreliable”). 
 212. See id. at *9, *11 (characterizing the plaintiff’s expert report as 
“methodologically sound and reliable,” but ultimately finding that the plaintiff 
did not meet her burden of proof).  
 213. Id. at *9. 
 214. Id. (citation omitted). 
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omitted variable bias and should not always negate the plaintiff’s 
expert’s regression results. 
B. Sample Size Examples 
Our sample of recent Title VII cases includes several cases in 
which the court discounted statistical evidence due to the size of 
the sample analyzed. In Coleman v. Exxon Chemical Corp.,215 the 
Southern District of Texas noted that “[w]hether a sample is too 
small to yield meaningful results is a determination made by the 
district court on a case-by-case basis.”216 It also recognized that 
the Fifth Circuit had cautioned against relying on studies with 
small sample sizes.217 In this race and gender discrimination 
case, the court held that the sample size of forty individuals (of 
which eight belonged to the protected class) was not inconclusive 
as a matter of law, but “any statistical analysis derived from such 
a small universe is far from conclusive and must be subjected to 
close scrutiny for reliability.”218 As a result, the court held that 
the statistical analysis was inadmissible.219 As noted above, valid 
conclusions can be drawn from such a sample size. Unfortunately, 
although the court did not hold the evidence inconclusive as a 
matter of law, it still discounted the regression analysis and 
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.220  
In Guerrero v. Reno,221 the Northern District of Illinois 
addressed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a 
disparate impact claim of national origin discrimination.222 The 
                                                                                                     
 215. 162 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
 216. Id. at 618 (quoting Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 
1289 n.20 (5th Cir. 1994)).  
 217. See id. (discussing the problems associated with small sample sizes).  
 218. Id. Part of this consideration was motivated by the fact that the 
inclusion of one outlier affected the results of the study. Id. at 618 n.34. 
 219. See id. at 617–20 (analyzing the plaintiffs’ statistical analysis and 
finding “serious methodological flaws”).  
 220. See id. at 618, 620–21 (summarizing the court’s conclusions regarding 
the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence).  
 221. No. 98 C 864, 2000 WL 1100400 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2000), aff’d sub nom. 
Guerrero v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 222. Id. at *1. 
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plaintiff presented a regression analysis to support his claim.223 
The regression showed a statistically significant disparity in the 
hiring of Hispanics for a specific job.224 However, the defendant’s 
expert attacked the report by arguing that a “sample size, of only 
thirty-four openings, was too small for reliable analysis.”225 
Although the court did not explicitly state that this argument had 
merit, it did not give any weight to the regression analysis when 
determining that the plaintiff had not introduced enough 
evidence to survive summary judgment.226 
In Thomas v. Deloitte Consulting LP, the defendant filed a 
motion to exclude the report of an expert statistician, which 
included a regression analysis.227 The report was submitted to 
advance the plaintiff’s claims of age and gender discrimination in 
the plaintiff’s termination.228 Ultimately, the court excluded the 
report due to concerns about statistical significance,229 and this 
discussion is expanded on in the following section.230 The court’s 
final decision—that the statistical significance of the results 
made the results unreliable—was also based on the “relatively 
small sample size.”231 However, as noted above, smaller samples 
actually make it more difficult to find statistically significant 
results, and thus, the court’s statement was misguided. In fact, 
the small sample size should have led the court to be more 
accepting of higher levels of statistical significance, and as a 
result, the court likely should not have excluded this evidence on 
this basis. 
                                                                                                     
 223. Id. at *6. 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. at *7. 
 226. See id. at *14 (discussing the court’s reasoning for finding insufficient 
evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim).  
 227. No. 3–02–CV–0343–M, 2004 WL 1960097, at *1, *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 
2004). 
 228. Id at *1. 
 229. See id. at *6 (excluding the plaintiff’s report because the analysis 
“either failed to test for statistical significance or did not use the proper 
threshold for statistical significance”). 
 230. See infra Part V.C (citing examples of cases in which courts addressed 
statistical significance issues).  
 231. See Thomas, 2004 WL 1960097, at *5 (discussing the court’s reasoning 
for excluding the plaintiff’s expert report).  
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The above examples from the sample of cases that we 
analyzed illustrate how arguments of sample size can taint a 
court’s decision at stages as early as evidentiary and summary 
judgment motions. Even if these arguments do not lead to an 
exclusionary motion or summary judgment ruling for the 
defendant, if the arguments are made again in the courtroom, 
they still have the opportunity to influence the judge or jury. 
C. Statistical Significance Examples 
In addition to Thomas, discussed in Part III.B above, in our 
sample of cases, there are several examples of the court strictly 
requiring a certain level of statistical significance for regression 
results to be admissible and persuasive. In E.E.O.C. v. Autozone, 
Inc.,232 the EEOC brought a disparate treatment claim of race 
discrimination and a pattern or practice claim of gender 
discrimination.233 To support the sex discrimination claim, the 
EEOC presented a regression analysis; however, the defendant 
challenged the analysis, claiming that the statistical significance 
of the main result was not reliable because it was significant at 
the 5% level and the Supreme Court had previously required 
significance at 2.3% in a different case.234 Even though the court 
correctly identified that the previous case dealt with a one-sided 
test, and this case dealt with a two-sided test, the court still 
implied that it would require 5% significance in a two-sided 
test.235 The court stated that “an approximation of two standard 
deviations at 5% is acceptable.”236 Because the plaintiff’s results 
were significant at 5% in a two-sided test, the court did rely on 
                                                                                                     
 232. No. 00-2923 Ma/A, 2006 WL 2524093 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2006). 
 233. Id. at *1. 
 234. See id. at *3 (criticizing the plaintiff’s regression analysis because it 
used “an arbitrary significance level that [did] not conform to the requirements 
of Castaneda v. Partida” (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 
(1977))). 
 235. See id. (noting that “[t]wo standard deviations is often approximated at 
5% for two-tailed tests” (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 
299, 318 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).  
 236. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 
n.17 (1977)).  
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the statistical evidence and did not grant summary judgment on 
the sex discrimination claim on that basis.237 
In Boyd v. Interstate Brands Corps.,238 the plaintiffs 
presented regression analyses to support class certification for 
their race discrimination claims.239 These regressions sought to 
prove a statistically significant disparity in promotions based on 
race.240 However, the court and the opposing experts challenged 
the results because they were not statistically significant.241 The 
plaintiff’s expert’s report found results that were statistically 
significant at the 7% level (or with p-values of .07) in a two-sided 
test.242 As a result, the report found that “the disparity in 
promotions for the relevant period was ‘within 0.02 of being 
statistically significant.’”243 Unfortunately, because of this 
(incorrect) statement, the court held that it did not even need to 
address the credibility of the report to determine that the 
plaintiffs did not meet their burden in establishing 
commonality.244 If the Eastern District of New York had not 
previously required statistical significance at the 5% level, then 
the expert would not have likely stated that his results were not 
statistically significant; perhaps, the court should have ignored 
the expert’s statement and relied on this valid statistical evidence 
to show commonality. If courts continue to apply such strict 
bright-line standards, then valid statistical evidence will not be 
introduced to support the claims of employment discrimination. 
                                                                                                     
 237. See id. at *3–7 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff 
used an arbitrary significance level, but ultimately deciding that the plaintiff’s 
results could not be considered relevant evidence due to flaws in the regression 
analyses).  
 238. 256 F.R.D. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 239. Id. at 362. 
 240. Id. at 360. 
 241. See id. at 361 (noting that the plaintiff’s expert “did not find a 
statistically significant disparity in promotion rates between African-American 
and non-African-American employees”). 
 242.  See Declaration of Mark R. Killingsworth ¶ 15, tbl. 5, Boyd v. 
Interstate Brands Corps., 256 F.R.D. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 00-CV-2249 
(JFB)(RML)), ECF No. 132-18 (summarizing the expert’s statistical findings 
regarding promotions and race).  
 243. Boyd, 256 F.R.D. at 362.  
 244. See id. (determining that “plaintiffs cannot get past the fact that Dr. 
Killingsworth did not find a statistically significant disparity in promotion 
rates”). 
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VI. Potential Solution 
Regression analyses can provide valuable evidence for both 
parties in employment discrimination cases, where direct 
evidence is often hard to come by. While we recognize the ability 
of experts to manipulate statistical evidence and the unreliability 
of certain techniques, we also recognize that these downfalls only 
occur in very limited circumstances. Opposing counsel and their 
experts are expected to attack the introduction of any evidence, 
but these attacks can also be manipulated and unreliable. When 
a plaintiff presents regression results establishing that she was 
treated differently in the workplace because she was a member of 
the protected class, the defendant often presents regression 
results contradicting those results. In addition, the defendant 
critiques the plaintiff’s regressions. However, three of the most 
common arguments made (that the regression suffers from 
omitted variables, a small sample size, and a lack of statistical 
significance) are only arguments with true merit in very few 
circumstances.245 As illustrated in Part IV.D, the introduction of 
these arguments decreases the probability that the plaintiff 
prevails and decreases the significance of presenting valid 
regression results that support the plaintiff’s case. As a result, 
this Article proposes that the court exercise its gatekeeping 
function by either acting under Daubert or establishing a peer-
review system to guarantee that only valid challenges to 
regression results enter the courtroom. 
A. Using Daubert 
Although it is a difficult task, judges are instructed under 
Daubert to consider whether expert testimony “can be (and has 
been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and 
publication, its known or potential error rate and the existence of 
maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether 
it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant 
scientific community” before allowing the testimony to enter the 
courtroom under Federal Rules of Evidence 702.246 As a result, 
                                                                                                     
 245. Supra Part III. 
 246. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993); see 
2422 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2365 (2014) 
judges will likely analyze whether expert reports that present 
regression results to establish or to refute employment 
discrimination meet the Daubert considerations.247 However, it is 
also important for judges to consider whether the plaintiff’s 
expert’s attacks of the opposing expert’s statistical techniques 
also meet the standards of Daubert.  
It is just as important that judges attempt to determine 
whether these criticisms are valid because they too have the 
ability to persuade the jury; unjust criticisms can persuade the 
jury to reject valid statistical evidence that can assist the plaintiff 
in a discrimination case. Unfortunately, judges may not be aware 
of the takeaways presented above and may be unable to 
determine whether certain econometric critiques are actually 
invalid. This Article proposes that judges consider these 
takeaways and remember to analyze the reliability of criticisms 
found in expert reports instead of only analyzing the actual 
regression analyses.  
Of course, we acknowledge that for judges to accurately make 
this decision they must be at least familiar with these three 
criticisms. Because experts will present both sides, the judge 
must be able to make an educated decision based on the 
underlying statistics. While this Article lays out exactly when 
each of the three criticisms is valid, it would likely take more 
than this brief exposure to guarantee that judges are prepared to 
make such an important decision. Judges must be educated on a 
variety of “scientific” topics to make any Daubert decision, 
including the admissibility of regression analyses. Many solutions 
to this education problem have been proposed. Scholars have 
called for judicial seminars to educate judges before litigation and 
independent research both before and during litigation.248 Both of 
these methods could incorporate education on econometric 
                                                                                                     
also FED. R. EVID. 702 (Testimony by Expert Witness). 
 247. See D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, 
and Fit in Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1985–87 
(2001) (recognizing the importance of strictly analyzing statistics under 
Daubert). 
 248. See Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert 
Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1270–75 (2007) (suggesting ways of “improving 
scientific admissibility decisions” through an educative approach). The use of 
court-appointed experts is discussed infra Part VI.B.  
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criticism. In particular, judicial conferences, such as the Science 
for Judges program,249 which are already in place, could easily 
make this incorporation. This Article could also serve as a source 
for judges seeking independent research. However, because 
educating judges is often time-consuming and impractical,250 we 
suggest that courts adopt a peer-review system. If a court adopts 
a peer-review system, such as the one proposed below, then the 
reliance on judicial education will be diminished.  
B. Using Peer Review 
Scholars concerned about the potential for junk science 
entering the courtroom through expert witness testimony have 
suggested several potential solutions to reduce those difficulties 
discussed in Part II.B. These proposed solutions include the use 
of court-appointed experts under Federal Rules of Evidence 
706;251 however, scholars have noted that this solution is not 
often practiced because it interferes with the adversary 
process.252 Other solutions propose the establishment of a center 
of scientific experts that would act as a selection mechanism for 
potential court-appointed experts253 and of an intermediary 
agency that answers blind technical questions for parties 
involved in litigation.254 Lawrence Pinsky also suggested that 
expert testimony be peer reviewed in a more traditional sense.255 
                                                                                                     
 249. See Cheng, supra note 248, at 1273 (discussing judicial education 
programs).  
 250. See id. at 1273–74 (discussing difficulties with judicial education). 
 251. See FED. R. EVID. 706 (Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses). Many states 
also have a similar rule. See Cheng, supra note 248, at 1270 & n.21 (noting that 
many states permit court-appointed experts). 
 252. See Karen Butler Reisinger, Note, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A 
Comparison of Two Models, 32 IND. L. REV. 225, 235–36 (1998) (discussing the 
opposition to court-appointed experts).  
 253. See Pinsky, supra note 53, at 545 (explaining solutions for assisting 
judges with handling complex scientific evidence).  
 254. See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
174, 206–09 (2010) (detailing the concept of using an intermediary agency to 
“function[] as a broker between sponsors of research (e.g., plaintiffs) and 
potential expert witnesses (e.g., doctors)”). 
 255. See Pinsky, supra note 53, at 558–62 (outlining the traditional methods 
of peer review). 
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In this solution, experts would present their reports during a 
pretrial hearing, and those reports would then be submitted to a 
committee for peer review.256 The opinions of the committee 
would then be submitted to the judge and parties for review, and 
the judge would then make a decision about the admissibility of 
the evidence before trial.257 
Pinsky’s proposed solution of peer review is a viable solution 
that would assist judges in not only determining whether 
regression analyses should enter the courtroom under Daubert 
but also in determining whether the criticisms of regression 
analyses should be admitted. If this proposed peer-review process 
applied in an employment discrimination case with regression 
analyses, both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s experts would 
present reports regarding the analysis they performed, including 
details on the variables included in the regression, the size of the 
sample, and how they calculated the statistical significance. In 
addition, the experts would also submit reports addressing their 
concerns with the opposing party’s reports. Each of these reports 
would then be submitted for peer review. Economists skilled in 
regression analysis would undertake this peer-review process, 
submitting a response addressing actual deficiencies in the 
regression analysis and acknowledging whether the opposing 
expert’s concerns have any merit. The judge would then take the 
peer-review commentary into account when determining not only 
whether the regression results should enter the courtroom but 
whether the opposing counsel and expert arguments that 
challenge the opposing party’s regression should also be 
restricted. Alternatively, the court could simply rely on the peer-
review commentary to expose the actual limitations of the 
regressions and not allow any additional criticisms to enter the 
courtroom.  
Specifically, we propose a peer-review system in which both 
parties agree to provide a certain percentage of the fees the 
parties paid to their econometric experts to finance peer 
review.258 Peer reviewers would be economists who do not 
                                                                                                     
 256. See id. at 543–44 (discussing a proposed peer-review solution to assist 
judges in determining the scientific validity of methodology employed by 
experts). 
 257. See id. (detailing the proposed peer-review solution).  
 258. If the plaintiff wins and the judge awards attorney’s fees, then the 
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generally serve as litigation experts but who are experienced with 
peer review as academic scholars. Because academic economists 
serve as peer reviewers for academic journals for no 
compensation (occasionally a token payment is made), 
compensation on the order of 5% to 10% of the total billings by 
experts will provide adequate compensation to induce academic 
economists to participate on occasion. The judge would select the 
peer reviewers similar to how a judge chooses a court-appointed 
expert under Rule 706.259 By selecting economists who do not 
generally serve as litigation experts, potential conflicts of interest 
will be avoided, as these economists will have no incentive to 
sway standards in expectation of benefiting from establishing 
statistical precedents.260  
A summary of the proposed process follows: each party will 
submit one report; either both parties will submit their original 
analyses (if both plaintiff and defendant provide a primary 
analysis) or the plaintiff will submit a report and the defendant 
will submit its rebuttal report. At this point, both reports will be 
submitted to the peer reviewer who will advise the judge on the 
legitimacy of the reports and critiques. Based on the judge’s 
assessment, invalid econometric critiques will be taken off the 
table, allowing parties to focus on only the appropriate and 
relevant issues in further rounds of expert reports and rebuttals 
and at trial. 
                                                                                                     
judge could also award peer-review fees. 
 259. See FED. R. EVID. 706 (“The court may appoint any expert that the 
parties agree on and any of its own choosing.”). 
 260. Anecdotally, many academic economists consider the litigation battle of 
experts to be difficult and often dishonest. As a result, economists who might be 
willing to be involved in litigation consulting if academic standards are 
maintained refuse to be involved as experts in anticipation that unscrupulous 
opposing experts (often professional consultants rather than academic 
economists) will launch erroneous and deceitful critiques. Because professional 
consultants have the advantage of greater litigation experience and are less 
concerned about their professional academic reputation, many qualified 
academic economists are driven out of the litigation arena. The proposed peer-
review system would allow academic standards to enter courts’ decision-making 
processes as an enhancement to the current adversarial process. 
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VII. Conclusion 
Regression analysis has served an important role in 
employment discrimination cases for more than thirty-five years. 
Unfortunately, even though statistical evidence has become 
critical to the plaintiff’s case in employment discrimination cases, 
regression analyses presented by a plaintiff to establish a prima 
facie case of disparate impact or disparate treatment do not 
increase the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing in a case. Often 
the inability of valid regression analysis to assist a party is the 
result of the opposing expert’s introduction of invalid econometric 
concerns. Because three of the most often cited econometric 
critiques are only valid in certain circumstances, judges must be 
aware that allowing such criticisms to enter the courtroom can 
influence the jury in a negative and unjustified way. As a result, 
judges should analyze the econometric criticisms presented under 
Daubert and limit the introduction of invalid econometric 
critiques. Because this solution likely requires extensive 
education of judges, courts should consider adopting a peer-
review system that would rely on unbiased economists and 
guarantee that only valid regression results and valid 
econometric critiques enter the courtroom. Without such 
measures, flawed econometric critiques will continue to 
completely invalidate valid statistical evidence. 
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